

  bargaining 
We define axiomatically a unique concept of value for games without transferable utilities, which is a generalization ofNash's bargaining model.


This is done for the kernel, nucleolus, bargaining set, value, core, and thevon NeumannMorgenstern solution.


Twoperson bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms


Tests were carried out on thirty pairs of subjects, using three different sets of conditions, for the purpose of experimentally validatingNash's axioms (and also, incidentally, certain other hypotheses of twoperson bargaining).


Asymptotic stability and other properties of trajectories and transfer sequences leading to the bargaining sets


The foundation of a dynamic theory for the bargaining sets started withStearns, when he constructed transfer sequences which always converge to appropriate bargaining sets.


It was shown byStearns [1968], and more recently byKalai, Maschler, andOwen [1973], that a certain iterative technique converges to points in the bargaining sets.


In the case of the bargaining set, it is shown for particular games thatb (i),m (i) are bounds ofxi.


In terms of the (bargaining) trajectories associated with a game (i.e.


A cardinal bargaining set for games without side payments


A bargaining set for games without side payments, based on cardinal considerations is introduced.


Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2person bargaining


A 2person fixed threat bargaining problem is considered.


There are bargaining situations in which the parties cannot arrive at an agreement through negotiations but rather must make one irreversible claim which may or may not be fulfilled.


In this paper we discuss a model for such a "oneshot bargaining".


We formulate this market as a cooperative game, and consider two kinds of solution concepts, the core and a bargaining set of the game.


Second, we obtain the bargaining set of the oligopolistic market.


Although theM1 bargaining set for games with side payments is known to exist, it frequently contains payoffs which are highly inequitable.


For this reason the more restrictedM2bargaining set is of interest.


SinceM2 is not known to exist in general, this paper introduces anM*bargaining set, contained inM1 and containingM2, and presents an existence theorem.




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