bargaining theory 
Missing ingredients in mutual gains bargaining theory


This note proves that the two person Nash bargaining theory with polyhedral bargaining regions needs only an ordered field (which always includes the rational number field) as its scalar field.


In this note we show that theuniqueness of the subgame perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining theory does not hold if the number of feasible agreements isfinite.


Some applications of our main findings to axiomatic bargaining theory are also studied.


Such problems have been extensively studied both in the theory of revealed preferences (Peters and Wakker, 1991) and in axiomatic bargaining theory under the assumption of convexity.


This stands in sharp contrast to the benchmarks of contract theory, where typically only the uninformed side proposes, and bargaining theory, where typically the agreement only specifies a transfer.


This paper analyzes the temporary equilibrium of 2sided markets from the point of view of bargaining theory.


Bargaining theory and the theory of the utility curves of money are tentatively suggested as triangulation points.


Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite


The crucial point of the derivation is that the author's special bargaining theory is not needed; the usual ZeuthenNashHarsanyi bargaining theory gives the same result.


It turns out (theoretically) that adding search to a simple bargaining mechanism eliminates some unsatisfactory features of bargaining theory.


Two concepts of monotonicity in twoperson bargaining theory


The value of axiomatic bargaining theory for choosing the unique solution in agreement games is considered.


A formulation of the aggregation problem in terms of coalition and bargaining theory


The method as well as the axioms are inspired by the Nash bargaining theory.


This deficiency is remedied in this paper by adding the Nashbargaining theory.


That is why the location of the natural equilibrium proves to be heavily dependent on the chosen bargaining theory.


The implication is that assessing the legitimacy of a given constitutional order or contract (on the basis of the natural equilibrium) depends on the particular bargaining theory chosen to solve the underlying constitutional distribution problem.


Abhinay Muthoo, Bargaining Theory with Applications


Taking advantage of recent developments in bargaining theory, we examine the bidding process for residential real estate.

