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public goods
A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
      
We characterize strategy-proof social choice functions when individuals have strictly quasi-concave, continuous and satiated utility functions on convex subsets of IRm, representing preferences for the provision of m pure public goods.
      
If the preference domain is the family of profiles of classical economic preferences over the space of allocations of public goods, then Φ is dictatorial.
      
Since 1979, several authors have proved Arrow-type impossibility results in situations such as models with public goods or private goods; and a few have considered mixed-goods or stochastic alternatives models.
      
A new domain restriction for the social choice rules is proposed and called the classical domain that is weaker than the free triple domain and holds for almost all economic environments such as economies with private and/or public goods.
      
Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence
      
We consider an economy with non-Samuelsonian public goods and we focus on linear cost sharing.
      
In a linear cost sharing equilibrium all agents in the economy optimize given a certain fixed cost share to be contributed towards the provision of public goods in the economy.
      
Hence, each agent pays a certain fraction of the total establishment costs of public goods and these cost shares are common knowledge.
      
Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods
      
We reconsider the problem of provision and cost-sharing of multiple public goods.
      
This note applies this principle to the problem of levying taxes to provide public goods.
      
Its purpose is to determine how taxes used to finance public goods must be structured in order to benefit each agent equally.
      
This paper considers the issue of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations and strong Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations for public goods economies when coalition patterns, preferences, and endowments are unknown to the designer.
      
Welfare-reducing growth may be avoided if environmental disruption may be directed taxed at low costs and/or government spending on public goods is not environmentally disruptive.
      
Using consistency properties, we characterize the cost-sharing scheme arising from the ratio equilibrium concept for economies with public goods.
      
We study a model with local public goods in which agents' crowding effects are formally distinguished from their taste types.
      
Unfortunately, such a price system allows for an arbitrary relationship between the public goods level in a given jurisdiction and the cost to an agent for joining.
      
It focuses on the choice of private and public goods, the method of financing, as well as the choice of information available for public decision-making.
      
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
      
 

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