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bargaining model
We consider a repeated family bargaining model that links the topics of employment and households.
      
We define axiomatically a unique concept of value for games without transferable utilities, which is a generalization ofNash's bargaining model.
      
Nash's two-person bargaining model consists of two stages: threat strategies and utility demands are chosen in the first and second stages respectively.
      
Separating equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty
      
In this paper, we analyze the class of all smooth separating sequential equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty.
      
We study a bargaining model where (i) players' interim disagreement payoffs are stochastic and (ii) in any period, the proposer may postpone making an offer without losing the right to propose in the following period.
      
This bargaining model has a generically unique perfect equilibrium payoff for each player, and the equilibrium outcome is inefficient in some cases, featuring a stochastically delayed agreement.
      
A simple "market value" bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems
      
We offer a bargaining model for weighted voting games that is a close relative of the nucleolus and the kernel.
      
After introducing our model, we provide a characterization result for this model and show its links to other bargaining model approaches in the literature.
      
The paper presents the bargaining model in which preferences of each player are expressed by the sequence of bargaining costs varying in time.
      
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model of a decentralised market.
      
A multi-person bargaining model based on sequential demands is studied for coalitional games with increasing returns to scale for cooperation.
      
We consider a k-player sequential bargaining model in which both the cake size and the identity of the proposer are determined by a stochastic process.
      
We study the effects of outsiders' threat and consecutive offers in the two-person bargaining model of Shaked and Sutton (1984).
      
This paper provides a bargaining model with asymmetric information about the buyer's cost structure.
      
This paper analyzes the formation of cartels of buyers and sellers in a simple model of trade inspired by Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1990) bargaining model.
      
I use a non-cooperative sequential bargaining model to analyze this question.
      
This result is consistent with a wage bargaining model augmented by political preferences of the union leaders and suggests that the effect of bargaining coordination depends on the political colour of the government.
      
We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information.
      
 

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