bargaining problem 
A 2person fixed threat bargaining problem is considered.


Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives states invariance of the solution outcome under certain contractions of the bargaining problem.


A dual of this axiom is proposed here, stating invariance under certainexpansions of the bargaining problem andNash's solution is characerized by substituting this axiom for IIA in Nash's original list.


Upper semicontinuous solutions of the bargaining problem are studied and also lower semicontinuous weak solutions of that problem are considered.


Equilibrium selection in a bargaining problem with transaction costs


The Bargaining Problem paradigm is extended to timeconsuming conflict situations.


We consider the bargaining problem in the context of a variable number of agents.


We prove the existence by giving a finite algorithm to calculate the Nash solution for a polyhedral bargaining problem, whose speed is of orderBm(m1) (m is the number of extreme points andB is determined by the extreme points).


We also show that the nonsymmetric Nash solution for the bargaining problem is also a special case of our general solution.


This problem is referred to as the Nash rationing problem, as it can be regarded as the translation of the Nash bargaining problem to a rationing scenario.


Confronting a recent study, the results for the second procedure imply that it is not necessary to appeal to "strictly controversial" issues in a bargaining problem in order to find multiplicity and delay in agreements


A characterization of the leximin solution of the bargaining problem


We analyze a pure bargaining problem when decisions require simple majority and self interested players make unilateral demands.


In the partition function bargaining problem the value of a coalition depends on the coalition structure in which it is embedded.


This paper applies the demandmaking bargaining game of coalition formation to the threeplayer partition function bargaining problem.


The strategically relevant values constitute a coalition function bargaining problem.


A classification in terms of the associated coalition function bargaining problem is provided.


A family of solutions to the bargaining problem with a variable population, generalizing the Egalitarian solution, is introduced under the name of Truncated Egalitarian solutions.


A reference function is a means of summarizing essential features of a bargaining problem.


For this to occur, however, the risk of negotiation must be affected by the agenda of the bargaining problem.

