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bargaining game
We propose an institutional bargaining game approach, focusing on goods, countries' individual bargaining situations and the fit with existing arrangements, and allowing an exploration of the evolution of trading arrangements in East Asia.
      
Starting from the solution of the bargaining game, symmetry, dynamics, stability and cooperability of the game are defined and investigated.
      
The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game
      
The feasible set in a Nash bargaining game is a set in the utility space of the players.
      
I present a non-cooperative bargaining game, in which responders may exit at any time and have endogenous outside options.
      
A simple bargaining game introduced by Nash is used for this purpose.
      
The stability of the conditioning is then studied as the bargaining game is played over an extended period.
      
We use a dynamical systems approach to model the origin of bargaining conventions and report the results of a symmetric bargaining game experiment.
      
Maschler, Owen and Peleg (1988) constructed a dynamic system for modelling a possible negotiation process for players facing a smooth n-person pure bargaining game, and showed that all paths of this system lead to the Nash point.
      
Finally, we model the communication process as a Rubinstein alternating-offer bargaining game and demonstrate that the resulting agreements help characterize the strongly stable set for a general class of communication mechanisms.
      
As a counter-example we present the n players Nash bargaining game, as well as a large class of "free-rider games."
      
This paper studies an alternating-offers bargaining game between possibly time-inconsistent players.
      
In the second, the buyer and seller engage in an alternating offer bargaining game once a match has occurred.
      
This note analyzes a modified version of the standard repeated-offers bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information studied in Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985), Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) and Ausubel and Deneckere (1989).
      
Second, Tirole considers competitive equilibria, while we analyze a simple bargaining game.
      
I study the first-round separating equilibrium of a buyer-seller bargaining game, extended to allow for asymmetric information, strategically delayed offers and offers restricted to a portion of the good.
      
First, for any bargaining game there is defined a non-cooperative game in strategic form, whose unique Nash equilibrium induces a payoff vector that coincides with the Nash solution of the bargaining game.
      
After that an -stage game in extensive form is presented whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium supports the Nash solution of the bargaining game.
      
We study a complete-information alternating-offer bargaining game in which one "active" player bargains with each of a number of other "passive" players one at a time.
      
This paper applies the demand-making bargaining game of coalition formation to the three-player partition function bargaining problem.
      
 

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