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bargaining game
Relative acceptability: A proposed strategy for the bargaining game
      
A noncooperative solution to a two-person bargaining game
      
I argue in this paper that there are two considerations which govern the dynamics of a two-person bargaining game, viz.
      
In this paper we consider a bargaining game in which players move simultaneously.
      
This paper reconsiders Rubinstein's alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information.
      
This paper tests the reciprocal kindness theory in Rabin (1993 Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics, The American Economic Review 83: 1281-1302) as an application to the one-period ultimatum bargaining game.
      
It can be interpreted as agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the (extremal) `acceptable priors' among which the decision maker has suspended judgment.
      
This paper presents the results of a within-subject experiment testing whether an increase in the monetary stakes by a factor of 50 - which had never been done before - influences individual behavior in a simple ultimatum bargaining game.
      
In this paper, an alternating demand bargaining game among n players is proposed, which envisages varying consensus requirements and commitment, both crucial in generating a unique and efficient outcome of the bargaining process.
      
We characterize equilibrium behavior in a finite horizon multiple-pie alternating offer bargaining game in which both agents have outside options and threat points.
      
A growing number of theoretical models predicts that such additional ratification hurdles result in an advantage for negotiators in the bargaining game.
      
After playing a bargaining game for a number of rounds, the agent may form a belief about his opponent's type and ne-tune his behavior accordingly.
      
A supplier's expected payoff in the bargaining game determines her willingness to invest in the noncontractible activities.
      
Also the initial sharing rule can not influence the ex post bargaining game between RU and C because V is not contractible ex ante.
      
As far as SS is concerned, let us assume that xBS is efficient for the principal in a bargaining game V.
      
Differences in reciprocal behavior between individuals are related to bidding behavior in a mutual ultimatum bargaining game.
      
Every split can be rationalized as the equilibrium of an appropriate bargaining game.
      
In his chapter Vermunt compares findings from the Ultimate Bargaining Game to those from the Dictator Game.
      
In the Ultimate Bargaining Game, one player makes an offer and the other player retains veto power.
      
In these circumstances, allocations are less fair than they are in the Ultimate Bargaining Game.
      
 

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