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讨价还价模型
    Game Analysis on the Basis of Bargaining Model in the Supply Chain
    基于讨价还价模型的供应链博弈分析
    DEA game is discussed through max-min DEA Nash Bargaining model.
    一、本文建立了Max-min DEA Nash讨价还价模型
    Based on the Rubinstern's(1982)bargaining model, this paper gives a new proof of the Shaked & Sutton'(1984) conclusion concerning the different discount coefficient with mathematical induction.
    本文运用博弈论基本原理 ,运用Rubinstern(1982 )讨价还价模型 ,针对贴现系数的不同情况 ,运用数学归纳法对Shaked&Sutton(1984 )的结论进行了证明
    Analyses on Bargaining Model of Green Management Between Multi-national Corporations and Government of the Developing Countries
    基于绿色管理的跨国公司与发展中国家讨价还价模型研究
    Function of Concession Behavior in Negotiation:A Experiment in the Bargaining model
    让步策略在谈判中的作用:讨价还价模型的一次经济学实验
    3. Beginning with factors resulting in SA failure, three key factors are analyzed. Firstly, the allocation formula of two players and many players are given out withNash bargaining model.
    从可能导致中小软件企业战略联盟失败的因素分析入手,选取分配、沟通、信任三个关键要素进行分析:①用博弈论中的纳什讨价还价模型导出了两人和多人利益分配的满意公式;
    Over the past few decades, many scholars who studied cooperation strategy on the supply chain issues made bargaining model, quantity discounts strategy and JIT batch models based on cooperation of game theory to achieve cooperation of the supply chain .
    过去几十年中,国内外许多学者对供应链合作策略问题进行了深入研究,并提出了讨价还价模型,数量折扣策略以及基于合作博弈的JIT批量模型等策略方法实现供应链合作。
    When the buyer or the solder is dominated in the supply chain, we build bargaining model, volume discounts based on cooperation and strategy of the game by JIT to give the ways how to distribute the benefits.
    在供应链中供需双方分别占主导地位的情况下,通过讨价还价模型,数量折扣策略以及基于合作博弈的JIT批量模型等不同策略方法给出了利益分配策略。
    Utilizing the Rubinstein bargaining model, we discuss how to distribute the system profit remained and obtain the best feasible Pareto efficient co_op new product R&D project.
    最后,采用Rubinstein讨价还价模型来分析系统剩余利润的分配问题,并获得了最优的可行帕累托有效合作新产品研发方案.
    This paper firstly talk about the general condition for Pareto optimality in the VMI system where non-cooperation game occurs considering pricing, production capacity and raw material procurement. Secondly the feasible set for Pareto optimality based on the Stackelberg equilibrium is developed. Thirdly we proposed a Nash bargaining model that can realize the Pareto optimality for the manufacturer and all retailers.
    首先讨论在考虑定价、生产能力和原料采购的VMI系统非合作博弈的基础上实现VMI系统Pareto最优的一般条件,其次给出了在Stackelberg博弈下的可行Pareto最优集问题,然后提出了实现生产商和定货商Pareto最优的Nash讨价还价模型,最后给出了算例加以说明合作给企业带来了较大的利润增加.
    The paper introduces the economic power and expands the bargaining model and designs the mechanism of the interest protection based on the Nashbargaining model.
    本文基于Nash讨价还价模型,引入经济权力概念,扩展了双人讨价还价模型和利益保护机制设计。
    Game theory and bargaining ability factors are employed to set up a bargaining model for alternate bid for the order transfer under capital-control mode. Order transfer prices are obtained with the model.
    运用博弈论知识,通过引入讨价还价能力因子,构建了资本控制型下订单在成员企业间转移时确定订单转移价格的轮流出价的讨价还价模型,并通过对该模型的求解得出了成员企业间的订单转移价格。
    Value distribution and pricing intermediate product of supply chain are studied in this paper by using Rubinstein_Stahl bargaining model. We discuss how to reach the rationality of value distribution of supply chain.
    应用Rubinstein-Stahl轮流出价的讨价还价模型研究了供应链的价值分配和中间产品的定价,从分配的角度探讨如何实现供应链价值分配的合理性.
    This paper uses the basic principle of the game theory,proves the feasibility that the bargaining model is used in the supply chain,and offers the basis on which nodal enterprises of the supply chain make decision.
    本文运用博弈论基本原理,论证了讨价还价模型在供应链中应用的可行性,为供应链节点企业的决策提供依据。
    In an artificial environment, there are two kinds of line-following robot group, and their benefit is conflicting. Make use of Nash equilibrium and Nash bargaining model, their profit behaviour is research by dissimilar strategy.
    在人造环境中,利用博弈论中的Nash均衡和Nash讨价还价模型,研究两个利益冲突的巡线机器人群体通过不同策略获得收益的行为。
    Based on the idea of Robinstein's bargaining model,the paper constructs a model of incomplete information between an upstream and a downstream firm,solves the model,analyzes the consequences and gets the result that the cooperation between the two firms depends mainly on their "bargaining costs" and the price anticipations of each other.
    运用鲁宾斯坦的讨价还价模型的思想,构造了供应链上下游企业间不完全信息轮流出价的讨价还价模型,求解模型并对所得结果进行分析,得出双方达成协议主要取决于双方的“谈判成本”及其关于对方价格的预期。
 

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