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投保财产
相关语句
  相似匹配句对
     Insure Love
     为爱情投保
短句来源
     On the Property of the Bankrupt
     论破产财产
短句来源
     the property pluralism of trust;
     信托财产多元化;
短句来源
     The interests of property insurance only need to belong to the insured , whether having it is not important to the insurer .
     财产保险利益仅需存在于被保险人,投保人是否享有无关紧要;
短句来源
     An Investigation into Insurance of Engineering Projects
     工程投保工作的探讨
短句来源
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  property insured
Policy in which the value of the property insured and amount to be paid in case of total loss are determined at policy inception.
      
  insured property
During 1990-1996 the United States experienced record-setting insured property losses due to numerous weather catastrophes, each event causing $100 million or more in losses (1991 dollars).
      
A hazard arising out of the use, condition or occupancy of the insured property.
      
An insurance policy under which the coverage follows the movement of the insured property.
      
In this respect the investment in the fire fighting water supply infrastructure greatly exceeds the annual insured property losses.
      
Loss not completely destroying insured property or exhausting the insurance limits applying to that property.
      
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This paper employs the principal agent theory to research the optimal insurance contracts under moral hazard. We construct two principal agent models for non moral hazard and moral hazard respectively. The first model illustrates the most fundamental result: under the symmetric information, the optimal insurance contract requires full insurance coverage, and the optimal insurance premium is equivalent to the expected loss. The moral hazard model yields the general contractual forms that the market responds...

This paper employs the principal agent theory to research the optimal insurance contracts under moral hazard. We construct two principal agent models for non moral hazard and moral hazard respectively. The first model illustrates the most fundamental result: under the symmetric information, the optimal insurance contract requires full insurance coverage, and the optimal insurance premium is equivalent to the expected loss. The moral hazard model yields the general contractual forms that the market responds to moral hazard with partial insurance coverage, and the final loss suffered by insured individuals is increasing with the total loss aroused by the accidents, and the optimal insurance premium is less than the expected loss.

分别针对事后信息对称和存在道德风险的情况 ,使用委托—代理理论建立了相应的保险契约分析模型 ,对两种情况下的最优保险契约的性质进行了研究 .我们证明了信息对称时 ,最优保险契约要求完全保险 ,从而可以达到帕累托最优的风险分担 ,而且此时最优保险费等于意外事件造成损失的期望值 ;存在道德风险时 ,出于激励的目的 ,最优保险契约要求只提供部分保险 ,最优保险费小于意外事件造成的期望损失 ,而且随着意外事件造成损失的增大 ,投保人所遭受的实际损失也应该增大 .在两种情况下 ,最优保险费都与投保财产成反比

This paper employs the principal agent theory to research the optimal insurance contracts under some particular moral hazard where private action of the insured only influence the probability of the accident. We construct principal\|agent models for the moral hazard. The model illustrates the most fundamental result: the market responds to the moral hazard with partial insurance coverage, and the final loss suffered by insured individuals is indifferent with the total loss aroused by the accidents, through...

This paper employs the principal agent theory to research the optimal insurance contracts under some particular moral hazard where private action of the insured only influence the probability of the accident. We construct principal\|agent models for the moral hazard. The model illustrates the most fundamental result: the market responds to the moral hazard with partial insurance coverage, and the final loss suffered by insured individuals is indifferent with the total loss aroused by the accidents, through the insurance policy we could gain the Parito\|optimal risk sharing.

针对投保人的行为影响所保事件发生 ,但不影响损失大小的情况 ,使用委托 -代理理论建立了相应的保险契约分析模型 ,对这种情况下的最优保险契约的性质进行了研究 .我们证明这种情况下 ,最优保险契约要求部分保险 ,但所保事件发生后 ,投保人所遭受的实际损失与意外事件造成的损失无关 ,可以达到帕累托最优的风险分担 .最优保险费与投保财产成反比

This paper employs the principal-agent to research the optimal insurance contracts under particular moral hazard where private action of the insurance only influence the probability of the accident. We construct principal-agent models for the moral hazard. The model illustrates the most fundamental result: the market responds to the moral hazard with partial insurance coverage, and the final loss suffered by insured individuals is indifferent with the total loss aroused by the accidents, through the insurance...

This paper employs the principal-agent to research the optimal insurance contracts under particular moral hazard where private action of the insurance only influence the probability of the accident. We construct principal-agent models for the moral hazard. The model illustrates the most fundamental result: the market responds to the moral hazard with partial insurance coverage, and the final loss suffered by insured individuals is indifferent with the total loss aroused by the accidents, through the insurance policy we could gain the Parito-optimal risk sharing.

针对投保人的行为影响所保事件发生,但不影响损失大小的情况,使用委托%D代理理论建立了相应的保险契约分析模型,对这种情况下的最优保险契约的性质进行了研究。证明了这种情况下,最优保险契约要求部分保险,但所保事件发生后,投保人所遭受的实际损失与意外事件造成的损失无关,可以达到帕累托最优的风险分担。最优保险费与投保财产成反比。

 
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