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总经理变更
相关语句
  ceo turnover
     The Characteristics of Board of Directors and CEO Turnover
     董事会特征与总经理变更
短句来源
     State Holding,Firm Performance and CEO Turnover:The Difference of Government Controlling
     国有控股、公司绩效与总经理变更:政府控制权的差异
短句来源
     The chapter empirically studies the influence of board of directors characteristics on the possibility of CEO turnover and the market reaction to the CEO turnover of ST companies.
     本章着重研究了内部控制变量对ST公司总经理变更的影响以及ST公司总经理变更对股东财富的影响。
短句来源
     Other governance variables, such as board size, independent directors and board ownership cannot significantly explain the CEO turnover.
     而其它治理变量,诸如董事会规模、管理董事比例、独立董事比例、股权集中度、董事会成员持股比例等,未能对总经理变更起到显著的解释作用。
短句来源
     The results indicate that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor performance in government direct holding companies is significantly lower than that in other firms,in which there is no significant difference.
     结果表明:政府直接控制型公司总经理变更对业绩的敏感性显著低于政府间接控制型公司,政府间接控制型公司间不存在显著差异;
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  “总经理变更”译为未确定词的双语例句
     The Shareholder's Structure and CEO Tumover in Chinese Listed Company
     中国上市公司股权结构与总经理变更
短句来源
  相似匹配句对
     The Characteristics of Board of Directors and CEO Turnover
     董事会特征与总经理变更
短句来源
     The Shareholder's Structure and CEO Tumover in Chinese Listed Company
     中国上市公司股权结构与总经理变更
短句来源
     On the Change of circumstances
     论情事变更
短句来源
     Research on the Regime of the Change of a Public Prosecution
     论公诉变更
短句来源
     On general managers of the State-owned enterprises
     论国有企业的总经理
短句来源
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  ceo turnover
Using a sample of banks from 1992 to 2004, I find that monitoring intensity plays a significant role in compensation levels, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and CEO turnover.
      
Based on Brickley's (2003) call for research on the CEO/turnover relation, we examine determinants of CEO age at succession.
      
Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover
      
We document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover and relate them to future performance.
      
Managerial pay in this type of firms is much lower than the six digit figures quoted for large public companies and CEO turnover is much higher than we expected.
      
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The current study examines how chief executive and top management team turnover to influence strategic change and performance improvement. Results indicate that top management turnover exhibits a positive effect on strategic change and SOEs performance improvement, and strategic change also has a positive effect on SOEs performance improvement. The authors argue that top management team turnover interact with strategic change increasing the likelihood to improve medium and large state-owned enterprises (M&L...

The current study examines how chief executive and top management team turnover to influence strategic change and performance improvement. Results indicate that top management turnover exhibits a positive effect on strategic change and SOEs performance improvement, and strategic change also has a positive effect on SOEs performance improvement. The authors argue that top management team turnover interact with strategic change increasing the likelihood to improve medium and large state-owned enterprises (M&L SOEs) performance in inland regions of China.

本文实证检验了内地多行业的国有大中型企业总经理和高层人事变动与企业战略和业绩变化之间的关系。结果显示 ,国企高层管理人员的人事变动与企业战略变化和企业绩效改善之间存在显著的正相关关系 ,企业战略的变化也与企业绩效的改善显著正相关 ,而国企总经理的变更与企业战略变化和绩效改善之间并不存在相关关系。研究认为 ,企业高层团队结构的变化与企业战略变化的协调作用 ,会增大国有大中企业绩效改善的可能性。

The article empirically examines the relationship between characteristics of board of directors and CEO turnover based on the data of the listed companies of Shanghai Stock Exchange. The results show that only the board meeting frequency and leader structure can explain the CEO turnover of relative performance decreasing companies. Other governance variables, such as board size, independent directors and board ownership cannot significantly explain the CEO turnover.

本文以在上海证券交易所1999年前上市的公司为样本,研究董事会特征等治理变量对总经理变更的影响。研究结果表明,对相对业绩下降公司的总经理变更能起到显著解释作用的变量只有董事会会议的次数和公司的领导结构。而其它治理变量,诸如董事会规模、管理董事比例、独立董事比例、股权集中度、董事会成员持股比例等,未能对总经理变更起到显著的解释作用。

Relationships among the shareholder's structures, performance, and forced, routine CEO turnover are analyzed. The research result shows CEO turnover, particularly forced CEO turnover, exerts effective governance on poor performance CEO in Chinese listed company. The percentages of state-owned share, outstanding share and largest shareowner's share have no significant relationship with both kinds of CEO turnover, which implies state shareowner; outstanding shareowner and largest shareowner are all not effective...

Relationships among the shareholder's structures, performance, and forced, routine CEO turnover are analyzed. The research result shows CEO turnover, particularly forced CEO turnover, exerts effective governance on poor performance CEO in Chinese listed company. The percentages of state-owned share, outstanding share and largest shareowner's share have no significant relationship with both kinds of CEO turnover, which implies state shareowner; outstanding shareowner and largest shareowner are all not effective to supervise CEO under its circumstance of state shareowner "default", the low proportion of outstanding share, strong speculative atmosphere. While there is no significant relationship between percentages of state-owned share, outstanding share and largest shareowner's share has no significant relationship with both kinds of CEO turnover, there is a remarkably negative relationship between the ratio of share held by senior management and CEO's turnover, which proves the existence of "insider control" in Chinese listed company.

研究上市公司股权结构、业绩与总经理的强制性变更和正常性变更的关系。可以发现,总经理的变更,特别是强制性变更作为最极端的约束手段,能够约束业绩差的总经理;国家股比例、流通股比例和大股东比例与总经理的强制性变更和正常性变更都不具有任何显著的相关性,这说明在国有股“所有者缺位”、流通股比例过低,市场投机气氛浓重的情况下,国家股东、流通股东以及大股东无法有效地监管经理人;而经理人持股比例与总经理的强制性变更和正常性变更之间具有非常显著的负相关性,证明了中国上市公司的“内部人控制”现象。

 
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