Applying the economic game theory,this paper studies the influences on the firm's product decision & national rate of customs duties with its cost dependent on exchange rate in the international trade under the condition of currency depreciation and draws some conclusions from the discussion.
Applying the economic game theory, this paper studies the influences on the firm' s product decision & national rate of customs duties with its cost depends on exchange rate in the international trade under the condition of currency depreciation and gets some conclusions from discussion.
The international political and economic games between China and developed countries (such as US. ,Japan and European union) is the important external environment on the reform of RMB exchange rate system.
According to historical evolution process of shareholder activism,basic motive power factor of institutional investor actively participating in corporate governance is analysized. And according to the relationship of corporate governance income and cost revealed by the effect on quantity of share and company,the income function of institutional investor is established and condition of encouraging is further discussed by applying economy game theory.
Based on the game theory and the situations of our commercial banks,we analyzed the influences of these gambling relations on administration of banks and risk control from economic cycles,trade competition,administration of human resources,credit and macroeconomic regulations.
And probed into the micro subject of exploitation of resources has inclined to decided on his own interests, shall combine macro adjustments of government with micro social dynamic role of subject together to analyse the policy of development and make project planning in check, impel the development of bio-diversity resources in mountain region to take the road to sustainable development.
On this basis, it argues that, notwithstanding the increasing mobility of capital, asymmetries in those structures persist and have important consequences for the rules of the international economic game as they are now evolving.
We show how a mechanism designer can implement desirable outcomes in certain economic games by manipulating only the probability that the game is played in a given round while leaving all other aspects of the game unchanged.
Without a long history of anonymous interactions, it is highly suspect whether the Tsimane or other traditional populations play economic games under assumptions of anonymity and one-shot exposure.