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客观绩效评价     
相关语句
  subjective performance appraisal
     As releasing the hypothesis gradually, this article adopts the classical Agent Model in order to analyze the optimal coefficient of incentive based on the objective performance appraisal and the subjective performance appraisal respectively.
     本文在分析经典代理模型基础上,逐步释放假设,分别基于客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价分析了企业最优激励的选择。
短句来源
     This conclusion drawn by this article is that, to design the incentive mechanism, the enterprise should integrate results of the objective performance appraisal with the subjective performance appraisal. Thus, the relational contract can reduce distortionary incentives would be created by the formal contract, while the formal contract may reduce the extra cost and risk of temptation to renege produced by the relational contract.
     研究结论认为,企业在实践中要综合考虑客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价的结果来设计激励制度,正式契约可以通过前者来降低由关系契约产生的额外激励成本和违约风险,关系契约则通过后者减少正式契约产生的激励扭曲问题。
短句来源
     As releasing the hypothesis gradually, this article adopts the classical Agent Model in order to analyze the optimal coefficient of incentive based on the objective performance appraisal and the subjective performance appraisal respectively.
     本文在分析经典代理模型基础上,逐步释放假设,分别基于客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价分析了企业最优激励方式。
     The conclusion drawn by this article is that, to design the incentive mechanism, the enterprise should integrate results of the objective performance appraisal with the subjective performance appraisal. Thus, the relational contract can reduce distortionary incentives would be created by the formal contract, while the formal contract may reduce the extra cost and risk of temptation to renege produced by the relational contract.
     研究结论认为,企业在实践中要综合考虑客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价的结果来设计激励制度,正式契约可以通过前者来降低由关系契约产生的额外激励成本和违约风险,关系契约则通过后者减少正式契约产生的激励扭曲问题。
     This article adopts the classical Agent Model to analyze the optimal coefficient of incentive based on the objective performance appraisal and the subjective performance appraisal respectively, and then probes into the micro-mechanism of the performance appraisal system.
     本文在分析经典代理模型基础上,分别基于客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价分析了企业最优激励及其组合, 并探讨了企业绩效评价系统设计的微观机理。
  the subjective performance appraisal
     As releasing the hypothesis gradually, this article adopts the classical Agent Model in order to analyze the optimal coefficient of incentive based on the objective performance appraisal and the subjective performance appraisal respectively.
     本文在分析经典代理模型基础上,逐步释放假设,分别基于客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价分析了企业最优激励的选择。
短句来源
     This conclusion drawn by this article is that, to design the incentive mechanism, the enterprise should integrate results of the objective performance appraisal with the subjective performance appraisal. Thus, the relational contract can reduce distortionary incentives would be created by the formal contract, while the formal contract may reduce the extra cost and risk of temptation to renege produced by the relational contract.
     研究结论认为,企业在实践中要综合考虑客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价的结果来设计激励制度,正式契约可以通过前者来降低由关系契约产生的额外激励成本和违约风险,关系契约则通过后者减少正式契约产生的激励扭曲问题。
短句来源
     As releasing the hypothesis gradually, this article adopts the classical Agent Model in order to analyze the optimal coefficient of incentive based on the objective performance appraisal and the subjective performance appraisal respectively.
     本文在分析经典代理模型基础上,逐步释放假设,分别基于客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价分析了企业最优激励方式。
     The conclusion drawn by this article is that, to design the incentive mechanism, the enterprise should integrate results of the objective performance appraisal with the subjective performance appraisal. Thus, the relational contract can reduce distortionary incentives would be created by the formal contract, while the formal contract may reduce the extra cost and risk of temptation to renege produced by the relational contract.
     研究结论认为,企业在实践中要综合考虑客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价的结果来设计激励制度,正式契约可以通过前者来降低由关系契约产生的额外激励成本和违约风险,关系契约则通过后者减少正式契约产生的激励扭曲问题。
     This article adopts the classical Agent Model to analyze the optimal coefficient of incentive based on the objective performance appraisal and the subjective performance appraisal respectively, and then probes into the micro-mechanism of the performance appraisal system.
     本文在分析经典代理模型基础上,分别基于客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价分析了企业最优激励及其组合, 并探讨了企业绩效评价系统设计的微观机理。
  objective performance appraisal
     As releasing the hypothesis gradually, this article adopts the classical Agent Model in order to analyze the optimal coefficient of incentive based on the objective performance appraisal and the subjective performance appraisal respectively.
     本文在分析经典代理模型基础上,逐步释放假设,分别基于客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价分析了企业最优激励的选择。
短句来源
     This conclusion drawn by this article is that, to design the incentive mechanism, the enterprise should integrate results of the objective performance appraisal with the subjective performance appraisal. Thus, the relational contract can reduce distortionary incentives would be created by the formal contract, while the formal contract may reduce the extra cost and risk of temptation to renege produced by the relational contract.
     研究结论认为,企业在实践中要综合考虑客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价的结果来设计激励制度,正式契约可以通过前者来降低由关系契约产生的额外激励成本和违约风险,关系契约则通过后者减少正式契约产生的激励扭曲问题。
短句来源
     As releasing the hypothesis gradually, this article adopts the classical Agent Model in order to analyze the optimal coefficient of incentive based on the objective performance appraisal and the subjective performance appraisal respectively.
     本文在分析经典代理模型基础上,逐步释放假设,分别基于客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价分析了企业最优激励方式。
     The conclusion drawn by this article is that, to design the incentive mechanism, the enterprise should integrate results of the objective performance appraisal with the subjective performance appraisal. Thus, the relational contract can reduce distortionary incentives would be created by the formal contract, while the formal contract may reduce the extra cost and risk of temptation to renege produced by the relational contract.
     研究结论认为,企业在实践中要综合考虑客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价的结果来设计激励制度,正式契约可以通过前者来降低由关系契约产生的额外激励成本和违约风险,关系契约则通过后者减少正式契约产生的激励扭曲问题。
     This article adopts the classical Agent Model to analyze the optimal coefficient of incentive based on the objective performance appraisal and the subjective performance appraisal respectively, and then probes into the micro-mechanism of the performance appraisal system.
     本文在分析经典代理模型基础上,分别基于客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价分析了企业最优激励及其组合, 并探讨了企业绩效评价系统设计的微观机理。
  “客观绩效评价”译为未确定词的双语例句
     Optimum combination of subjective & objective performance measurements
     主观绩效评价与客观绩效评价的优化组合
短句来源
     This paper studies the existing shortcomings in faculty pay system, and suggests redesigning of faculty pay scheme based on proper combination of objective performance and subjective performance measurement.
     在此基础上 ,本文分析了目前高校薪酬制度存在的弊端 ,提出以客观绩效评价为主 ,辅于主观评价的高校薪酬制度再设计思路 ,并说明了新薪酬制度可克服多任务的替代效用 ,为我国高校体制配套改革发挥积极的作用。
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  subjective performance appraisal
An examination of employee perceptions of a subjective performance appraisal system
      
  objective performance measurement
It is very likely that most of the respondent organizations lack an objective performance measurement system for customer IICT implementation.
      


The relationship between top managers of university and faculty is a typical multi-task principal—agent relationship. Performance—contingent compensation scheme always leads faculty to misallocate their efforts, since teaching performance is hard to be measured precisely. This paper studies the existing shortcomings in faculty pay system, and suggests redesigning of faculty pay scheme based on proper combination of objective performance and subjective performance measurement.

大学董事会 (或管理层 )与教师之间是典型的多任务代理关系 ,由于教学质量难以精确确证 ,基于业绩的薪酬制度 ,导致了任务的替代性 ,弱化代理人对委托人的价值贡献。在此基础上 ,本文分析了目前高校薪酬制度存在的弊端 ,提出以客观绩效评价为主 ,辅于主观评价的高校薪酬制度再设计思路 ,并说明了新薪酬制度可克服多任务的替代效用 ,为我国高校体制配套改革发挥积极的作用。

In classic agency model, first best efficiency cant be achieved due to the trade off between risk and incentives except that agency is risk neutral. Whereas if the principals objective is not contractible, an alternative objective performance measurement which is contractible is always proposed. However, if the reaction of this objective performance measurement to agencys effort differs from that of the principals objective, the agent would game performance measures, which leads to loss of efficiency, even...

In classic agency model, first best efficiency cant be achieved due to the trade off between risk and incentives except that agency is risk neutral. Whereas if the principals objective is not contractible, an alternative objective performance measurement which is contractible is always proposed. However, if the reaction of this objective performance measurement to agencys effort differs from that of the principals objective, the agent would game performance measures, which leads to loss of efficiency, even if agency is risk neutral. By adding subjective weights on objective measures, or combination of subjective performance measurement with objective performance measurement, efficiency can be regained. Implications for CEO pay are also discussed.

在经典代理模型中 ,除非代理人是风险中性的 ,激励和保险难以兼顾 ,因而 Pareto效率一般不能实现 .而当委托人的真正目标不能被写入合同 (源于不可观或不可验证 ) ,需要寻找一个可写入合同的客观目标来替代 .然而 ,如果替代目标关于代理人所付出的努力之反应异于委托人的真正目标 ,往往给代理人以机会主义行为之机 ,因而效率低下 .为达到 Pareto效率 ,需要引进主观评价机制 .给出了主观绩效评价与客观绩效评价的优化组合 ,并讨论其在建立国有企业企业经营者激励与约束机制方面的应用 .

In this paper, principal-agent theory in information economics is applied to study how banks establish the incentive system for their employees in the bancassurance business. An incentive model based on both objective performance evaluation and subjective performance evaluation is established. Because it involves fuzzy evaluation factors with the character of multi-factor and multi-grade, 2-grade fuzzy comprehensive evaluation is adopted in subjective performance evaluation. In the end, we use this model in...

In this paper, principal-agent theory in information economics is applied to study how banks establish the incentive system for their employees in the bancassurance business. An incentive model based on both objective performance evaluation and subjective performance evaluation is established. Because it involves fuzzy evaluation factors with the character of multi-factor and multi-grade, 2-grade fuzzy comprehensive evaluation is adopted in subjective performance evaluation. In the end, we use this model in the practical problem of bancassurance business in shanghai.

本文运用信息经济学里的委托-代理人理论,研究了银行保险中银行对其代理保险的员工的激励问题,建立了将主观绩效评价和客观绩效评价相结合的激励模型,其中主观绩效评价因涉及多因素多层次的模糊评价因素,采用二级模糊综合评判的方法。并将此模型运用于上海地区的银行保险激励的实际问题。

 
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