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国有企业经理人    
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  state-owned enterprise manager
    On the Professional of State-owned Enterprise Manager:Inevitability and Practical Contradiction
    国有企业经理人职业化:必然性与现实矛盾
短句来源
    Under this background, study of "from deprofessionaliztion to professionalism: The transition of the state-owned enterprise manager in China" has a great theoretical and realistic significance.
    在这一背景下,研究“从非职业化到职业化:中国国有企业经理人的转型”就具有了重大的理论与现实意义。
短句来源
    The article discusses the intension, concept, quality and ability to the professional manager. The article carries on research that is to realize state-owned enterprise manager " from deprofessionaliztion to professional development " and then changes the role further, with the method of literature comparative study and chart, and based on the theory of human resources development and management and commission agency's theory.
    文章通过对职业经理人的内涵、概念、素质和能力的理论探讨,以人力资源开发与管理的理论和委托代理理论为基础,以文献法、比较研究法和图表法等方法对实现国有企业经理人从“非职业化”到职业化的发展,进而转变国有企业经理人角色进行研究。
短句来源
    Put forward the strategic countermeasure that is to realize state-owned enterprise manager from " deprofessionaliztion to professionalism development ".
    进而提出实现国有企业经理人从“非职业化”到职业化发展的战略途径。
短句来源
    On the country , changing government's management function , improving the modern enterprise system, improving manager related mechanism that market operate come , to put up professional life stage of development of manager of state-owned enterprise; to create the environment of manager's professional development of state-owned enterprise, that is way to realize state-owned enterprise manager from " deprofessionaliztion to professionalism development ".
    在国家层面上,通过转变政府管理职能,完善现代企业制度,完善经理人市场运行的配套机制来搭建国有企业经理人职业化发展的人生舞台,创造国有企业经理人职业化发展的环境;
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Research on the incentive, analysis current situation of the incentive and constraint of state owned enterprise in China and use the experiences of the West countries for reference, how to set up a better incentive and constraint mechanism has been studied.(1)Setting up the effective incentive and constraint mechanism of SOE manager should be combined with the reforming classified of SOE and the establishing of the modern enterprise system.(2) Finding a new utility function.(3) Regard the material incentive...

Research on the incentive, analysis current situation of the incentive and constraint of state owned enterprise in China and use the experiences of the West countries for reference, how to set up a better incentive and constraint mechanism has been studied.(1)Setting up the effective incentive and constraint mechanism of SOE manager should be combined with the reforming classified of SOE and the establishing of the modern enterprise system.(2) Finding a new utility function.(3) Regard the material incentive as core and include the incentive of material, reputation and spirit, society, and protect.(4)Based on market constraint and include the law and regulation, and society supervise.

结合已有理论 ,分析国有大中型企业高层经理人员激励约束机制的现状 ,借鉴西方国家的成功经验 ,对建立一套更为有效的激励约束机制进行探讨。 (1)建立有效的国有企业经理人的激励约束机制 ,要与国有企业分类改革、建立现代企业制度相结合 ;(2 )组建新的适合国企经理人的效用函数 ;(3)激励机制应以物质激励为核心 ,综合声誉和精神激励、社会激励、保护激励等 ;(4 )约束机制以市场约束为基本 ,综合法律约束和社会约束

This thesis puts great emphasis on the analysis of the malady in motivation mode which has led to the poor efficiency in state-owned enterprise, and puts forward that it is urgent to set up a set of mode of motivation to rouse the manager's potential, and to improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprise.

本文通过对国有企业经理人现有的激励模式分析 ,指出其明显的缺陷与不足 ,并分析了产生这种缺陷和不足的原因 ,最后 ,试图建立一种适应国有企业的新的激励模式 ,以提高其经济效益

Following Choe and Yin(2000), this paper discusses the choice of punishment mechanism to the managers under contract management responsibility system by Chinese government under the assumptions that the government is leader and both the government and manager are risk neutrals, We have following conclusions: Government will choose a symmetric (punishment and reward are consistent), risk sharing and proportion punishment mechanism, and don't to adopt a fixed amount punishment mechanism which the managers take...

Following Choe and Yin(2000), this paper discusses the choice of punishment mechanism to the managers under contract management responsibility system by Chinese government under the assumptions that the government is leader and both the government and manager are risk neutrals, We have following conclusions: Government will choose a symmetric (punishment and reward are consistent), risk sharing and proportion punishment mechanism, and don't to adopt a fixed amount punishment mechanism which the managers take full risk.

本文沿用Choe与Yin( 2 0 0 0 )的模型架构 ,在政府主导以及在政府与经理人同为风险中立者的前提下 ,讨论中国大陆政府对于承包制国有企业经理人惩罚机制选择上的问题 ,获得如下的结论 :政府将会选择采用具有对称性 (奖励惩罚比例一致 )共担风险的比例惩罚机制 ,而不愿采用由经理人单方面完全承担风险的固定惩罚金额制度。

 
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