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总经理报酬
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  “总经理报酬”译为未确定词的双语例句
     A Study on the Compensation Performance Sensitivity of General Managers in Listed Companies
     上市公司总经理报酬业绩敏感性研究
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     Determinants of Executive Compensation:Empirical Research on Listed-Company in China
     中国上市公司总经理报酬影响因素的实证研究
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     An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance for CEO'S Payment Mechanism in Chinese Listed Corporations
     公司治理机制对总经理报酬影响之实证研究
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     Analysis of Elements Influencing the Remuneration of General Managers in Corporate Groups
     企业集团总经理报酬的影响因素分析
短句来源
     It turns out to be that the overall contribution rate of the three factors on the level of executive's compensation is 8. 9% in 1999 and 30.7% in 2000.
     实证研究表明,两年里,企业业绩、企业规模和董事会控制强度3类因素对总经理报酬的总解释率分别为8.9%和30.7%.
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     Analysis of Elements Influencing the Remuneration of General Managers in Corporate Groups
     企业集团总经理报酬的影响因素分析
短句来源
     A Study on the Compensation Performance Sensitivity of General Managers in Listed Companies
     上市公司总经理报酬业绩敏感性研究
短句来源
     Return on investment.
     ③投资报酬
短句来源
     Reward Systems that Really Work
     真正行之有效的报酬体系
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     On general managers of the State-owned enterprises
     论国有企业的总经理
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Compensation is the primary factor in incentive system. It is a difficult problem for both native and overseas scholars to make clear the determination of executive's compensation. By reviewing overseas research in this field and analyzing the characteristics of Listed-companies in China, the paper suggests some hypothesis about the relation of executive's compensation and some factors including enterprise performance, firm scale, directorate control intensity. The Covariance Structural Model (CSM) is for the...

Compensation is the primary factor in incentive system. It is a difficult problem for both native and overseas scholars to make clear the determination of executive's compensation. By reviewing overseas research in this field and analyzing the characteristics of Listed-companies in China, the paper suggests some hypothesis about the relation of executive's compensation and some factors including enterprise performance, firm scale, directorate control intensity. The Covariance Structural Model (CSM) is for the first time used to analyze the relation between the executive's compensation and its determinants in the listed-companies with the data of China listed-companies in 1999 and 2000. The model examines three factors including the enterprise's performance, the enterprise's scale and directorate control intensity. It turns out to be that the overall contribution rate of the three factors on the level of executive's compensation is 8. 9% in 1999 and 30.7% in 2000.

总经理报酬是总经理激励机制的主要因素,如何决定总经理报酬是迫切需要研究的问题.通过对国外相关研究的综述和结合我国上市公司特点的分析,形成了关于企业绩效、企业规模和董事会控制强度与总经理报酬之间关系的假说,并以1999和2000年上市公司为样本,首次利用协方差结构模型对总经理报酬和其影响因素之间关系的假说进行了检验和分析.实证研究表明,两年里,企业业绩、企业规模和董事会控制强度3类因素对总经理报酬的总解释率分别为8.9%和30.7%.

In the theory of Principal and Agent, the research on the payment of operators focuses on the payment incentive mechanism for CEO's decided by the board. The board decides the payment for CEO's, which relies on the ownership of the corporation. So, the scheme of payment is the result of the game between operators and governance determinants. This paper analyzes the relationship between governance determinants and the payment for CEO's, and probes into how corporate governance mechanism influences the CEO's payment...

In the theory of Principal and Agent, the research on the payment of operators focuses on the payment incentive mechanism for CEO's decided by the board. The board decides the payment for CEO's, which relies on the ownership of the corporation. So, the scheme of payment is the result of the game between operators and governance determinants. This paper analyzes the relationship between governance determinants and the payment for CEO's, and probes into how corporate governance mechanism influences the CEO's payment in listed corporations.

委托———代理理论对经营者报酬问题的研究 ,着重于董事会作用下的报酬机制。在不设立专门的报酬委员会时 ,董事会决定报酬的行为事实上依赖于公司所有权结构。所以具体的报酬方案是经营者与治理因素博弈的结果。通过公司治理因素与总经理报酬关系的实证研究 ,探求我国上市公司治理机制对总经理报酬的解释力。

Analysing the effects of the characteristics of earnings fluctuation of a company, finance leverage of a company, company scale, board governance, block shareholder governance and managerial entrenchment on compensation performance sensitivity of the general managers in listed companies in China, we find that the first five characteristics do not have obvious influences on compensation performance sensitivity, while the three managerial entrenchment characteristics as the dual status of the general manager,...

Analysing the effects of the characteristics of earnings fluctuation of a company, finance leverage of a company, company scale, board governance, block shareholder governance and managerial entrenchment on compensation performance sensitivity of the general managers in listed companies in China, we find that the first five characteristics do not have obvious influences on compensation performance sensitivity, while the three managerial entrenchment characteristics as the dual status of the general manager, the status of board member and his term in the board have evident influences on compensation performance sensitivity. An even more important finding is that when the corporate's performance becomes better, the compensation performance sensitivity increases, while the corporate's performance worsens, the compensation performance sensitivity decreases, and the two managerial entrenchment characteristics as the dual status of the general manager and his term in the board will further decrease the compensation performance sensitivity.

文章分析了公司的收益波动、公司财务杠杆、公司规模、董事会治理、大股东治理、经理自利特征对我国上市公司总经理报酬业绩敏感性的影响,发现前五个特征对报酬业绩敏感性无显著影响,但是总经理的双重身份、董事身份和其在董事会中任期这三个经理自利特征对报酬业绩敏感性有显著影响;更重要的发现是,当公司业绩变好时报酬业绩敏感性增加,当公司业绩下滑时报酬业绩敏感性减小,而总经理双重身份和其在董事会中任期这两个经理自利特征使报酬业绩敏感性进一步降低。

 
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