助手标题  
全文文献 工具书 数字 学术定义 翻译助手 学术趋势 更多
查询帮助
意见反馈
   委托—代理人理论 的翻译结果: 查询用时:0.009秒
图标索引 在分类学科中查询
所有学科
中国政治与国际政治
更多类别查询

图标索引 历史查询
 

委托代理人理论
相关语句
  “委托—代理人理论”译为未确定词的双语例句
     This paper introduces the principal-agency theory that improves the efficiency of the state-owned assets.
     使用委托—代理人理论提高我国国有资产的使用效率。
短句来源
  相似匹配句对
     Principal-agent Theory
     委托代理理论
短句来源
     Incentive Contract for Insurance Agents Based on Principal - Agent Theory
     基于委托代理理论的保险代理人佣金设计
     On Principal-agent Theory
     委托代理理论述评
短句来源
     Principal-agency theory.
     委托代理理论概述。
短句来源
     fourthly,the consignation-agency theory;
     来源于委托代理理论;
短句来源
查询“委托—代理人理论”译词为用户自定义的双语例句

    我想查看译文中含有:的双语例句
例句
没有找到相关例句


In this paper, principal-agent theory in information economics is applied to study how banks establish the incentive system for their employees in the bancassurance business. An incentive model based on both objective performance evaluation and subjective performance evaluation is established. Because it involves fuzzy evaluation factors with the character of multi-factor and multi-grade, 2-grade fuzzy comprehensive evaluation is adopted in subjective performance evaluation. In the end, we use this model in...

In this paper, principal-agent theory in information economics is applied to study how banks establish the incentive system for their employees in the bancassurance business. An incentive model based on both objective performance evaluation and subjective performance evaluation is established. Because it involves fuzzy evaluation factors with the character of multi-factor and multi-grade, 2-grade fuzzy comprehensive evaluation is adopted in subjective performance evaluation. In the end, we use this model in the practical problem of bancassurance business in shanghai.

本文运用信息经济学里的委托-代理人理论,研究了银行保险中银行对其代理保险的员工的激励问题,建立了将主观绩效评价和客观绩效评价相结合的激励模型,其中主观绩效评价因涉及多因素多层次的模糊评价因素,采用二级模糊综合评判的方法。并将此模型运用于上海地区的银行保险激励的实际问题。

In the front of malpractice of the traditional mode of public administration,new wave of globalization,international competition and reform of technology and private corporation and a series of new theory on pubic administration,such as public choice theory and so on,the new public administration movement springs up.The new public administration movement claims the public affairs managed by person and through modes of enterprise management and so on.The new ideas offer many useful experiences to the Chinese...

In the front of malpractice of the traditional mode of public administration,new wave of globalization,international competition and reform of technology and private corporation and a series of new theory on pubic administration,such as public choice theory and so on,the new public administration movement springs up.The new public administration movement claims the public affairs managed by person and through modes of enterprise management and so on.The new ideas offer many useful experiences to the Chinese system reform of public administration.

传统公共行政模式的弊端,全球化与国际竞争,社会技术变革和私营部门的变革,公共选择理论、委托代理人理论和交易成本理论等理论支持和催生了新公共管理运动的兴起。新公共管理倡导公共服务的民营化,以顾客为导向,建立企业型的政府,提高办事效率,弹性应变,用企业家的精神和理念来经营政府,最大限度地利用资源,不断创新思路,获取公众的信任与支持。新公共行政模式的诞生和流行有其深刻的社会背景,给我国的行政管理体制改革和行政实践提供了宝贵经验和诸多启示。

This paper introduces the principal-agency theory that improves the efficiency of the state-owned assets.It analyzes the problems in the efficiency of stated-owned assets,based on the game theory,dicusses principal-agency relationship in operation and provides the incentive mechanism for the general manager of state-owned enterprises.The paper presents the measures of improving the efficiency of state-owned assets involving the restraint mechanism and incentive mechanism,under which there will be the identical...

This paper introduces the principal-agency theory that improves the efficiency of the state-owned assets.It analyzes the problems in the efficiency of stated-owned assets,based on the game theory,dicusses principal-agency relationship in operation and provides the incentive mechanism for the general manager of state-owned enterprises.The paper presents the measures of improving the efficiency of state-owned assets involving the restraint mechanism and incentive mechanism,under which there will be the identical objectives between manager and enterprise.

使用委托—代理人理论提高我国国有资产的使用效率。目前国有资产使用效率中存在诸多的问题,针对这些问题,从博弈论的角度,通过“选择报酬和连续努力水平的委托—代理人模型”分析国有资产运作中的委托—代理关系,提供了一种针对企业最高层决策者—总经理—的激励机制思路;针对国有资产使用中低效率的问题,提出了一种提高国有资产使用效率的有效途径,即国家控股公司按照一定的参与约束和激励约束来设计对总经理的报酬函数,在这样的激励下,使总经理的努力目标和企业目标相一致。

 
图标索引 相关查询

 


 
CNKI小工具
在英文学术搜索中查有关委托—代理人理论的内容
在知识搜索中查有关委托—代理人理论的内容
在数字搜索中查有关委托—代理人理论的内容
在概念知识元中查有关委托—代理人理论的内容
在学术趋势中查有关委托—代理人理论的内容
 
 

CNKI主页设CNKI翻译助手为主页 | 收藏CNKI翻译助手 | 广告服务 | 英文学术搜索
版权图标  2008 CNKI-中国知网
京ICP证040431号 互联网出版许可证 新出网证(京)字008号
北京市公安局海淀分局 备案号:110 1081725
版权图标 2008中国知网(cnki) 中国学术期刊(光盘版)电子杂志社