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listed enterprise
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    This article analyzed how the market responds after right offer announcement , listed enterprise's achievement, the shareholder rights as well as interests value changes.
    文章从配股的公告效应角度开始,分析配股公告后的市场反应,以及配股对公司经营业绩、股东权益价值的影响,最后分析配股行为的深层次原因。
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This paper analyzes the overinvestment of China's listed enterprises which have the preferences of equity financing, basing on information asymmetries and divergences of stockholders' objectives on the equity structure design. We show that the special equity structure design of China's listed enterprises will cause the overinvestment of equity financing even though information asymmetries are not considered, and if information asymmetries and the special equity structure design are considered, the...

This paper analyzes the overinvestment of China's listed enterprises which have the preferences of equity financing, basing on information asymmetries and divergences of stockholders' objectives on the equity structure design. We show that the special equity structure design of China's listed enterprises will cause the overinvestment of equity financing even though information asymmetries are not considered, and if information asymmetries and the special equity structure design are considered, the possibility of overinvestment of China's listed enterprises will be large than it of enterprises which stockholders have the same rights with information asymmetries.

本文运用一个包含有信息不对称和我国现有股权制度安排下的股东目标差异等因素在内的企业股权融资投资决策模型 ,分析了我国上市企业股权融资偏好下过度投资的形成机制。分析的结果表明 ,即使不考虑信息不对称因素 ,我国上市企业同股不同权、流通股比例偏低的股权制度安排也会导致股权融资下的过度投资行为发生 ;在同时考虑信息不对称和我国上市企业特殊股权制度安排的情况下 ,与仅考虑信息不对称因素的成熟证券市场上同股同权企业股权融资下的投资行为相比 ,我国上市企业股权融资下过度投资发生的可能性要大得多

The high systemic risk of China stock market originates from the average quality's "lemonization" of the enterprises listed on that market, and the state of the listed enterprises' "lemonization" is "endogenous" in developing stock market during China transaction course. The stock exchange in the market packed with listed "lemon" enterprises will inevitably be a kind of speculation behavior, and this kind of speculative transaction has strengthened the systemic risk of the stock...

The high systemic risk of China stock market originates from the average quality's "lemonization" of the enterprises listed on that market, and the state of the listed enterprises' "lemonization" is "endogenous" in developing stock market during China transaction course. The stock exchange in the market packed with listed "lemon" enterprises will inevitably be a kind of speculation behavior, and this kind of speculative transaction has strengthened the systemic risk of the stock market of our country. So one important route chosen to dissolve high systemic risk in Chinese stock market is to correct the function reservation of stock market, improve the administration structure of listing enterprises, open all-sidedly to the non-state enterprises and overseas-funded enterprises, allow those non-state enterprises and overseas-funded enterprises accord with listing standard list on China stock market.

中国股票市场高系统性风险根源在于中国股票市场上市的企业的平均质量的“柠檬化”,而这种上市企业“柠檬化”又是中国转型过程中发展股票市场的功能定位所“内生”的,而在充斥“柠檬”上市企业的股票市场上的股票交易必然会是一种投机行为,此种投机交易强化了我国股票市场的系统风险.因此,化解中国股票市场高系统性风险的一种重要的路径选择就是矫正发展股票市场的功能定位,改进上市企业的治理结构,向非国有企业和外资企业全面开放,允许符合上市标准的非国有企业和外资企业在中国股票市场上市.

The small-and-medium-sized enterprises board was put f orward as concepts of implementing GEM step by step, but the small-and-medium-si zed enterprises board is not GEM. Except that the stock scale is smaller or equa ls 30 million at present, small-and-medium-sized listed enterprises board has no difference at all with main board in other standards. Because of little risk an d slow growth compared with real GEM stock, the appeal to risk investment is muc h smaller. Establishing the system...

The small-and-medium-sized enterprises board was put f orward as concepts of implementing GEM step by step, but the small-and-medium-si zed enterprises board is not GEM. Except that the stock scale is smaller or equa ls 30 million at present, small-and-medium-sized listed enterprises board has no difference at all with main board in other standards. Because of little risk an d slow growth compared with real GEM stock, the appeal to risk investment is muc h smaller. Establishing the system of multi-level capital market enables enterpr ises with high risk such as high-tech enterprise to enter the GEM to absorb risk investment, while enables the private enterprises and the small-and-medium-size d enterprises to enter the small and medium-sized enterprises board. So the smal l-and-medium-sized enterprises board is not only ways to GEM.

中小企业板是作为分步实施创业板的概念提出来的 ,但是中小企业板却并非创业板。目前中小企业板上市的企业除了盘子小于等于 30 0 0万 ,其他标准与主板完全没有区别 ,这类股票相比真正的创业板股票风险更小 ,其成长性也不会像真正创业板的股票那样高 ,因此 ,对风险投资的吸引力要小得多。建立多层次资本市场体系 ,可以让高科技企业等风险高的创业企业上创业板市场 ,以吸引风险投资 ;让风险低的民营企业、中小企业上中小企业板市场。因此 ,中小企业板不是创业板的必由之路。

 
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