Venture capitalist can guard against the morals hazard of entrepreneur through contract , which is optimal capital-structure contract in financing decision , is combining to equity fraction , stock design and staging finance , in order to make enterprise financing cost minimum , profit maximum, it is minimum that informational asymmetries' level fall to.
This viewpoint is different from Admati & Pleiderer (1994 ) , they think: Optimal contract is that venture capitalist maintains the stock of fixed fraction in every stage, it can eliminate the motivation of the morals hazard of entrepreneur, at the same time, in this paper ,I have also analyzed the mistake of domestic scholar about equity proportion of venture capitalist .
by using the theory of the principal-agent, discuss how the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur utilize the rational contract and participate effectively in management to attain their mutual mobilization;
At investment Stage of venture capital, through analysing the arrangement such as the choice of investment tool, staging of investment and estimating Enterprises' value again based on Enterprise's achievement, control distribution etc. First, choice of investment tool is the core of agreement, and determines the principal-agent relationship between venture capitalist and entrepreneur to a great extent.
The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing.
According to the motivating and restraint mechanism,Under the condition of satisfaction the qualification and institution the principal to implement the motivating and restrain mechanism of ChangSha City Commercial Bank entrepreneur.
Also namely, in the given opportunity cost of investment that venture capitalist use staging investment pattern under the condition of opportunity cost, share with entrepreneur, and select the form of debt or equity.
What appears much more important, is a critique of the myths and ideologies surrounding knowledge and service work, which Vo? and Pongratz have described in their well known concept of the ?employee-entrepreneur".
The second part studies women's guides to success and sketches out, in which ways the female entrepreneur of her self differs from her male counterpart.
However, the average bamboo entrepreneur consumed an amount of their own farm produce worth MK 26 679 (US$ 247), which was about 1.5 times as much as average bamboo income of MK 18 417 (US$ 170).
My analysis shows that modern finance theory only offers useful insights in VC-entrepreneur collaboration when both support and interference are separately investigated.
Based on asymmetric information, this paper analyzes the principal and agency relationship among three agents in venture capital (investor, venture capitalist and entrepreneur). It suggests there are two game relationships among three agents which is relation between investor and venture capitalit, venture capitalist and entrepreneur. It also indicates that venture capitalist should take unlimited responsibility, and build credit standing.Venture capitalist should award a convertible preferred s...
The multi-stage decision making process is the first s tep to mitigate information asymmetry.After screening and due diligence,the all ocation of equity stake between entrepreneur and venture capital firm is the key element of contract. The paper explains an adverse selection problem using sign alling game in venture capital market.Then analyses and compares separating. poo ling and semi-separating equlibrium.
Co operation between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist is necessary for venture capital. Based on the two stage investing model and the analysis of dynamic game between them, we suggest that the realization of Nash equilibrium depends on the value increasing of the venture enterprise and the entrepreneur's benefit from taking opportunitical strategies. Furthermore, we discuss the improvement of the Co operation machanism between them.