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buy back contract     
相关语句
  回购合同
     A Study on Buy Back Contract of Perishable Goods under Retail Inventory Competition
     多个零售商库存竞争下的易逝品回购合同研究
短句来源
     International petroleum contracts include six types of the concession contract, the production sharing contract, the risk service contract, the buyback contract, the joint venture and the national petroleum company privatization.
     国际石油合同包括租让制合同、产品分成合同、风险服务合同、回购合同、联合经营和国家石油公司私有化6类。
短句来源
     Buy back contract can coordinate the above supply chain and divide the whole (expected) profit between supplier and retailers arbitrarily.
     同时回购合同可以实现供应链协调,能在供应商和零售商之间任意分配整个供应链期望利润;
短句来源
     Buy back contract can coordinate supply chain and allot the whole expected profit between supplier and retailers arbitrarily.
     回购合同可实现供应链协调,能在供应商和经销商间任意分配供应链利润。
短句来源
     Study on Buy Back Contract of Goods in University
     高校后勤采购中回购合同问题研究
短句来源
更多       
  回购合同
     A Study on Buy Back Contract of Perishable Goods under Retail Inventory Competition
     多个零售商库存竞争下的易逝品回购合同研究
短句来源
     International petroleum contracts include six types of the concession contract, the production sharing contract, the risk service contract, the buyback contract, the joint venture and the national petroleum company privatization.
     国际石油合同包括租让制合同、产品分成合同、风险服务合同、回购合同、联合经营和国家石油公司私有化6类。
短句来源
     Buy back contract can coordinate the above supply chain and divide the whole (expected) profit between supplier and retailers arbitrarily.
     同时回购合同可以实现供应链协调,能在供应商和零售商之间任意分配整个供应链期望利润;
短句来源
     Buy back contract can coordinate supply chain and allot the whole expected profit between supplier and retailers arbitrarily.
     回购合同可实现供应链协调,能在供应商和经销商间任意分配供应链利润。
短句来源
     Study on Buy Back Contract of Goods in University
     高校后勤采购中回购合同问题研究
短句来源
更多       
  回购契约
     Research on Buy back Contract Mechanism for Supply Chain Coordination With a Risk-Averse Retailer
     具有风险规避者加盟的供应链协作回购契约机制研究
短句来源
     Supply Chain Coordination under Disruptions with Buy Back Contract
     回购契约下供应链对突发事件的协调应对
短句来源
  回购契约机制
     Research on Buy back Contract Mechanism for Supply Chain Coordination With a Risk-Averse Retailer
     具有风险规避者加盟的供应链协作回购契约机制研究
短句来源

 

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  buy back contract
Further efforts are being taken to make some arrangement for buy back/contract farming for the crop so that the farmers get remunerative price.
      


A quantitative risk measurement method was developed to analyze the influence of the coordination mechanism on risk allocation in the supply chain. The method was used to study risk allocation when the supply chain achieves channel coordination with several commonly used contracts. When a buy back contract is used, the risk of the retailer is equal to that of the manufacture. When a two part tariff contract is used, the risk of one unit is zero and the risk of the supply chain system is taken...

A quantitative risk measurement method was developed to analyze the influence of the coordination mechanism on risk allocation in the supply chain. The method was used to study risk allocation when the supply chain achieves channel coordination with several commonly used contracts. When a buy back contract is used, the risk of the retailer is equal to that of the manufacture. When a two part tariff contract is used, the risk of one unit is zero and the risk of the supply chain system is taken by the other side. When a target rebate contract is used, the risk of the retailer is larger than that of the supply chain. The characteristics of these contracts were then combined into a new kind of contract where the supply chain achieves channel coordination and the system profit and risk of arbitrarily are allocated between the retailer and the manufacturer.

为了研究供需链系统的协调机制对系统风险分配的影响,提出了一种系统风险的量化方法。使用该方法证明了供需链达到协调状态时,回购策略下供需双方风险不变;双边价格策略下,供需链上下游总有一方风险为零,另一方承担系统全部风险;而目标减免折扣策略下销售商风险始终大于供需链系统风险。结合对经典合同策略的分析,提出了一种新的策略形式,不但能够协调供需链系统,而且可将利润与风险在供需双方任意分配。

In a two-echelon supply chain of perishable goods consisted by a supplier and multi-retailers, the market price is exogenous, the retailers are symmetry and they sell the same perishable product, the market demand is stochastic. There (exist) inventory competition among them. When the supplier adopts buy back contract, the retail inventory game exists an (unique) pure-strategic Nash equilibrium. Buy back contract can coordinate the above supply chain and divide the whole (expected) profit between...

In a two-echelon supply chain of perishable goods consisted by a supplier and multi-retailers, the market price is exogenous, the retailers are symmetry and they sell the same perishable product, the market demand is stochastic. There (exist) inventory competition among them. When the supplier adopts buy back contract, the retail inventory game exists an (unique) pure-strategic Nash equilibrium. Buy back contract can coordinate the above supply chain and divide the whole (expected) profit between supplier and retailers arbitrarily. At last we discuss some reasons why Buy back contract is popular in practice.

在单个供应商和多个零售商构成的易逝品两级供应链中,市场终端价格固定,各个零售商对称且在同一区域市场销售相同产品,市场需求不确定;库存越多,销量期望值越大,零售商之间存在库存竞争。采用贴近实际的有效需求函数证明供应商采用回购合同时,零售商库存竞争存在惟一的纯策略纳什均衡;同时回购合同可以实现供应链协调,能在供应商和零售商之间任意分配整个供应链期望利润;最后讨论回购合同常见的几个原因。

The problem of designing an optimal buy back contract to maximize the supplier′s profits in a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain is solved. When the marginal cost of the retailer is private information, principal-agent models are used to derive the supplier′s optimal buy back policy. It is shown that it is no longer possible to let the retailer′s order quantity achieve the solution when the supplier has complete information. And the supply chain coordination is not obtained. In this case,...

The problem of designing an optimal buy back contract to maximize the supplier′s profits in a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain is solved. When the marginal cost of the retailer is private information, principal-agent models are used to derive the supplier′s optimal buy back policy. It is shown that it is no longer possible to let the retailer′s order quantity achieve the solution when the supplier has complete information. And the supply chain coordination is not obtained. In this case, the total profits and the supplier′s profits are lowered while those of the buyer are improved. The value of supplier′s contracts menu augments as the increase of the marginal cost of the retailer.

为了解决供需链中下游实体的成本是私有信息的情况下,上游供应商的回购决策问题,运用委托-代理模型研究了供应商的最优回购策略,得到了供应商的最优决策方案.与对称信息的情况相比,信息结构的非对称导致下游实体的订货量低于系统的最优订货量,使得供需链无法达到协调,供需链的总利润和供应商的利润降低,零售商的利润增加.在非对称信息下,供应商提供的契约菜单值随着下游实体成本的增加而增大.

 
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