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bargaining game    
相关语句
  讨价还价博弈
    Bargaining Game Analysis of Stakeholders in State-owned Enterprises' ESOP
    国有企业ESOP中利益相关者讨价还价博弈分析
短句来源
    4. By making a systematic analysis of the foundation course of cooperation Game, this thesis makes a key research on the bargaining game model between the manufacturers and the suppliers.
    4.系统地分析了供应链中建立合作博弈的过程,在此基础上文中重点研究了供应链中制造商和供应商之间的讨价还价博弈
短句来源
    Second,under colleges and universities environment,graduate students in colleges and universities and post-graduate academic evaluation system between instructors and psychological game,although academic performance and evaluation indicators for postgraduate bargaining game with the academic integrity of educators copied game;
    其二、高校中观环境下,研究生与高校学术评价制度以及研究生与导师之间的心理博弈,表现为研究生与刚性学术评价指标的讨价还价博弈,与教育者的学术诚信的模仿博弈;
短句来源
  讨价还价博弈
    Bargaining Game Analysis of Stakeholders in State-owned Enterprises' ESOP
    国有企业ESOP中利益相关者讨价还价博弈分析
短句来源
    4. By making a systematic analysis of the foundation course of cooperation Game, this thesis makes a key research on the bargaining game model between the manufacturers and the suppliers.
    4.系统地分析了供应链中建立合作博弈的过程,在此基础上文中重点研究了供应链中制造商和供应商之间的讨价还价博弈
短句来源
    Second,under colleges and universities environment,graduate students in colleges and universities and post-graduate academic evaluation system between instructors and psychological game,although academic performance and evaluation indicators for postgraduate bargaining game with the academic integrity of educators copied game;
    其二、高校中观环境下,研究生与高校学术评价制度以及研究生与导师之间的心理博弈,表现为研究生与刚性学术评价指标的讨价还价博弈,与教育者的学术诚信的模仿博弈;
短句来源
  讨价还价博弈
    Bargaining Game Analysis of Stakeholders in State-owned Enterprises' ESOP
    国有企业ESOP中利益相关者讨价还价博弈分析
短句来源
    4. By making a systematic analysis of the foundation course of cooperation Game, this thesis makes a key research on the bargaining game model between the manufacturers and the suppliers.
    4.系统地分析了供应链中建立合作博弈的过程,在此基础上文中重点研究了供应链中制造商和供应商之间的讨价还价博弈
短句来源
    Second,under colleges and universities environment,graduate students in colleges and universities and post-graduate academic evaluation system between instructors and psychological game,although academic performance and evaluation indicators for postgraduate bargaining game with the academic integrity of educators copied game;
    其二、高校中观环境下,研究生与高校学术评价制度以及研究生与导师之间的心理博弈,表现为研究生与刚性学术评价指标的讨价还价博弈,与教育者的学术诚信的模仿博弈;
短句来源
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  bargaining game
A growing number of theoretical models predicts that such additional ratification hurdles result in an advantage for negotiators in the bargaining game.
      
We characterize equilibrium behavior in a finite horizon multiple-pie alternating offer bargaining game in which both agents have outside options and threat points.
      
In this paper, an alternating demand bargaining game among n players is proposed, which envisages varying consensus requirements and commitment, both crucial in generating a unique and efficient outcome of the bargaining process.
      
This paper presents the results of a within-subject experiment testing whether an increase in the monetary stakes by a factor of 50 - which had never been done before - influences individual behavior in a simple ultimatum bargaining game.
      
It can be interpreted as agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the (extremal) `acceptable priors' among which the decision maker has suspended judgment.
      
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The paper studies the relationships between the fiscal policies of local governments and firms' equity financing in China by continuous time dynamic bargaining game model and test the model by statistical data. The conclusion of theory is that if the time preferences of two parties in the game are consistent, the collocation of residual control right (or call it relative bargaining advantage) will not influence their welfare; but when the time preferences of two parties in the game are...

The paper studies the relationships between the fiscal policies of local governments and firms' equity financing in China by continuous time dynamic bargaining game model and test the model by statistical data. The conclusion of theory is that if the time preferences of two parties in the game are consistent, the collocation of residual control right (or call it relative bargaining advantage) will not influence their welfare; but when the time preferences of two parties in the game are not consistent, the collocation of residual control right is important to the welfare of two parties, which implies that the collocation of residual control right need not be relevant to transaction costs. And the conclusions of positive research mean that: (1) when increased their extra-budgetary surplus, the local governments' fiscal expenditure and fiscal deficit increase continually, but the fiscal deficit does not support the equity financial behavior of enterprises; (2) the local governments would like to play the co-operative game in the extra-budgetary fields but the firms expect the game happen in the inner-budgetary; (3) the NSOEs (Non-Stated-Owned-Enterprises) more possibly play the game in the extra-budgetary fields than SOEs (Stated-Owned-Enterprises) and the local governments more possibly play the game with NSOEs than SOEs in the fields. The positive conclusions imply the local government owns the residual control right when their time preferences are not consistent.

论文通过建立连续时间动态讨价还价模型对地方政府与企业所有者之间的博弈关系进行了理论研究,并对双方策略选择关系进行了实证检验。理论研究的结果表明,如果博弈双方的时间偏好相同,剩余控制权(或者称之为相对讨价还价优势)的配置与博弈双方的福利水平无关;而时间偏好不相同时,剩余控制权的配置将影响双方的福利水平,这个研究结论与是否存在交易成本不必相关。通过实证研究,论文的研究结果表明:(1)地方政府追求预算外盈余的行为会导致其增加财政支出最终导致财政赤字持续增加,但这些财政赤字并没有为企业股权融资提供有效的支持;(2)地方政府的财政更愿意与企业在预算外的领域合作,而企业则更愿意与地方政府在预算内合作;(3)非国有企业较国有企业更愿意和地方政府在预算外合作,而地方政府也更愿意和非国有企业在预算外的领域合作。这些实证结果说明地方政府在时间偏好不一致的情况下拥有剩余控制权。

From the angle of game research,the institution of Chinese private capital entering domestic banking is the result of many factors,especially the game between government regulations and private capitals.The institutional transition route can be regarded as the track of equilibrium solutions of game.This paper first establishes the quantitative analysis model of "dynamic matching and bargaining game," then analyzes how this game got its result with cases and expounds details of its change's historical...

From the angle of game research,the institution of Chinese private capital entering domestic banking is the result of many factors,especially the game between government regulations and private capitals.The institutional transition route can be regarded as the track of equilibrium solutions of game.This paper first establishes the quantitative analysis model of "dynamic matching and bargaining game," then analyzes how this game got its result with cases and expounds details of its change's historical route and route characters.

从博弈分析的角度来看,转型期中国民间资本进入银行业是多方博弈的结果,其制度变迁过程可以看成是国家与民间资本之间的博弈过程,变迁的路径就是博弈均衡解的轨迹。本文通过建立该制度变迁的动态匹配博弈模型,实证地分析这种制度是如何被博弈出来的,详细阐述该制度变迁的历史路径与路径特征,并提出相应政策建议。

In electricity market,long-term contract is one of the important means of transaction.With the negotiation means of certain capacity and uncertain price,this paper constructs the bargaining game model in Unilateral Opening Electricity Market.In the model,there are incomplete information and alternating offers between power generation company and transaction center.Through solving the model and analyzing the conclusions,it believes that,whether the two bargainers can reach the bargain lies on the transaction...

In electricity market,long-term contract is one of the important means of transaction.With the negotiation means of certain capacity and uncertain price,this paper constructs the bargaining game model in Unilateral Opening Electricity Market.In the model,there are incomplete information and alternating offers between power generation company and transaction center.Through solving the model and analyzing the conclusions,it believes that,whether the two bargainers can reach the bargain lies on the transaction center's estimation on generation cost.At last,the paper proposes that we should design the effective auction mechanism for power spot market,which will encourage the power generation company to reveal its true costs,thus to facilitate the transaction of long-term contract,and to improve the efficiency of the whole electricity market.

合同交易是电力市场的重要交易方式之一。在单边开放电力市场中,针对谈判型长期合同,构建了发电公司与交易中心的序贯不完全信息讨价还价博弈模型,求解模型并对所得的结果进行分析,认为合同能否达成主要取决于交易中心对发电公司单位发电成本的估计。最后提出设计有效的实时电力市场竞价机制,鼓励发电公司揭露其真实成本,有利于电力长期合同的达成,从而提高整个电力市场的效率。

 
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