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  bargaining game
A growing number of theoretical models predicts that such additional ratification hurdles result in an advantage for negotiators in the bargaining game.
      
We characterize equilibrium behavior in a finite horizon multiple-pie alternating offer bargaining game in which both agents have outside options and threat points.
      
In this paper, an alternating demand bargaining game among n players is proposed, which envisages varying consensus requirements and commitment, both crucial in generating a unique and efficient outcome of the bargaining process.
      
This paper presents the results of a within-subject experiment testing whether an increase in the monetary stakes by a factor of 50 - which had never been done before - influences individual behavior in a simple ultimatum bargaining game.
      
It can be interpreted as agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the (extremal) `acceptable priors' among which the decision maker has suspended judgment.
      
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On the basis of a brief introduction of game theory, this paper incorporates classical game models such as Prisoners Dilemma, Boxed Pigs, Chicken Game and Bargaining Game to simulate the existing games in domain of hydraulic and hydropower construction in China. Game analyses show that the traditional investment arrangement relying on the central government is not able to achieve optimized resource allocation; the central government's intervention is necessary in coordinating...

On the basis of a brief introduction of game theory, this paper incorporates classical game models such as Prisoners Dilemma, Boxed Pigs, Chicken Game and Bargaining Game to simulate the existing games in domain of hydraulic and hydropower construction in China. Game analyses show that the traditional investment arrangement relying on the central government is not able to achieve optimized resource allocation; the central government's intervention is necessary in coordinating the local governments, located at the upstream and the downstream; contention of engineering projects and apportionment of investment not only imply the conflict in economic benefit and rationalities of each participant himself, but also will be determined by interaction and influence among participants each other.

在简单介绍博弈论的基础上,采用经典的囚徒困境、智猪博弈、斗鸡博弈和讨价还价等博弈模型,对我国水利水电建设中存在的博弈进行了模拟。博弈分析表明:以中央政府为主的传统投资机制难以实现资源最优配置;江河流域上、下游地方政府之间在水利水电工程建设协调问题上存在困难,需要中央政府的干预;水利水电建设项目的竞争和投资分摊问题,不仅关系到各参与人自身的经济理性和经济利益,而且是各参与人相互影响和相互作用的结果。

In electricity market,long-term contract is one of the important means of transaction.With the negotiation means of certain capacity and uncertain price,this paper constructs the bargaining game model in Unilateral Opening Electricity Market.In the model,there are incomplete information and alternating offers between power generation company and transaction center.Through solving the model and analyzing the conclusions,it believes that,whether the two bargainers can reach the bargain lies on the transaction...

In electricity market,long-term contract is one of the important means of transaction.With the negotiation means of certain capacity and uncertain price,this paper constructs the bargaining game model in Unilateral Opening Electricity Market.In the model,there are incomplete information and alternating offers between power generation company and transaction center.Through solving the model and analyzing the conclusions,it believes that,whether the two bargainers can reach the bargain lies on the transaction center's estimation on generation cost.At last,the paper proposes that we should design the effective auction mechanism for power spot market,which will encourage the power generation company to reveal its true costs,thus to facilitate the transaction of long-term contract,and to improve the efficiency of the whole electricity market.

合同交易是电力市场的重要交易方式之一。在单边开放电力市场中,针对谈判型长期合同,构建了发电公司与交易中心的序贯不完全信息讨价还价博弈模型,求解模型并对所得的结果进行分析,认为合同能否达成主要取决于交易中心对发电公司单位发电成本的估计。最后提出设计有效的实时电力市场竞价机制,鼓励发电公司揭露其真实成本,有利于电力长期合同的达成,从而提高整个电力市场的效率。

>=the decision of construction diversion standards has influence on the investment cost, period, risk,its risk loss of diversion structure and choice of diversion schemes, which is negotiated continually between different subjects of decision-making such as investor and design engineer. It is their different value tendency of risk to hydroelectric power project that leads to the asymmetric information of diversion schemes. So the bargaining game mechanism between investor and design engineer should be...

>=the decision of construction diversion standards has influence on the investment cost, period, risk,its risk loss of diversion structure and choice of diversion schemes, which is negotiated continually between different subjects of decision-making such as investor and design engineer. It is their different value tendency of risk to hydroelectric power project that leads to the asymmetric information of diversion schemes. So the bargaining game mechanism between investor and design engineer should be established to improve their awareness of diversion schemes. As expected monetary value decision criterion doesn’t take decision maker’s subjective factors during the bargaining game process of diversion schemes asymmetric information problem, the paper puts forward expected utility value criterion based on risk analysis theory, utility theory, and entropy theory, discusses how to make risk of construction diversion system reasonable configure. Under the guidance that utility value of every diversion time interval is equal, utility function of decision maker is confirmed and the utility losing computation model of diversion standard is put forward. Subjects of decision-making demand risk and its risk loss diminish by degrees with the development of construction. Then considering the asymmetric information condition and that diversion standard of every diversion time interval is floating, utility value of every diversion time interval is confirmed finally through the bargaining game mechanism. According to utility value of every diversion time interval, risk configuration mechanism of construction diversion system based on bargaining game platform is established under the guidance of expectation utility losing equilibrium principle. In summary, according to the demand of construction diversion schemes decision, decision theory that develops from expected monetary value decision criterion to expected utility value criterion and risk configuration mechanism that develops from the rigid one to the dynamic risk configuration mechanism based on bargaining game platform are put forward in the paper, which helps to achieve harmonious risk balance and its optimization of hydroelectric construction system.

the decision of construction diversion standards has influence on the investment cost, period, risk,its risk loss of diversion structure and choice of diversion schemes, which is negotiated continually between different subjects of decision-making such as investor and design engineer. It is their different value tendency of risk to hydroelectric power project that leads to the asymmetric information of diversion schemes. So the bargaining game mechanism between investor and design engineer should be establi...

the decision of construction diversion standards has influence on the investment cost, period, risk,its risk loss of diversion structure and choice of diversion schemes, which is negotiated continually between different subjects of decision-making such as investor and design engineer. It is their different value tendency of risk to hydroelectric power project that leads to the asymmetric information of diversion schemes. So the bargaining game mechanism between investor and design engineer should be established to improve their awareness of diversion schemes. As expected monetary value decision criterion doesn't take decision maker's subjective factors during the bargaining game process of diversion schemes asymmetric information problem, the paper puts forward expected utility value criterion based on risk analysis theory, utility theory, and entropy theory, discusses how to make risk of construction diversion system reasonable configure. Under the guidance that utility value of every diversion time interval is equal, utility function of decision maker is confirmed and the utility losing computation model of diversion standard is put forward. Subjects of decision-making demand risk and its risk loss diminish by degrees with the development of construction. Then considering the asymmetric information condition and that diversion standard of every diversion time interval is floating, utility value of every diversion time interval is confirmed finally through the bargaining game mechanism. According to utility value of every diversion time interval, risk configuration mechanism of construction diversion system based on bargaining game platform is established under the guidance of expectation utility losing equilibrium principle. In summary, according to the demand of construction diversion schemes decision, decision theory that develops from expected monetary value decision criterion to expected utility value criterion and risk configuration mechanism that develops from the rigid one to the dynamic risk configuration mechanism based on bargaining game platform are put forward in the paper, which helps to achieve harmonious risk balance and its optimization of hydroelectric construction system.

 
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