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bargaining game
相关语句
  协商对策
    Incentive Equilibria for Dynamic Bargaining Game Problems
    动态协商对策的诱导平衡
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  协商对策
    Incentive Equilibria for Dynamic Bargaining Game Problems
    动态协商对策的诱导平衡
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  bargaining game
A growing number of theoretical models predicts that such additional ratification hurdles result in an advantage for negotiators in the bargaining game.
      
We characterize equilibrium behavior in a finite horizon multiple-pie alternating offer bargaining game in which both agents have outside options and threat points.
      
In this paper, an alternating demand bargaining game among n players is proposed, which envisages varying consensus requirements and commitment, both crucial in generating a unique and efficient outcome of the bargaining process.
      
This paper presents the results of a within-subject experiment testing whether an increase in the monetary stakes by a factor of 50 - which had never been done before - influences individual behavior in a simple ultimatum bargaining game.
      
It can be interpreted as agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the (extremal) `acceptable priors' among which the decision maker has suspended judgment.
      
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In this article, the multi-person multi-criteria decision problems with incomplete information are considered. An approach for this kind of problems is proposed. A joint decision model extended from Nash Bargaining Game model is presented and some theorems concerning the optimal solution are proved. A solution procedure to solve the multi-person multi-criteria decision problems with various kinds of information structures is designed.

本文分析了有限方案的多人冲突性决策问题,提出一种冲突各方偏好信息不完全时的决策方法,该方法能够处理在冲突各方偏好信息均完全、有一方偏好传息不完全以及双方偏好信息均不完全三种情况下的方案比较与排序问题。文中给出了有限方案多人冲突决策问题的数学描述,提出并证明了几条有关方案优劣比较与排序的定理,设计了一种排序算法,并证明了该算法的正确性。

Based on the incentive methods of Stackelberg game,the dynamic bargaining game problems are considered and the concept of incentive equilibria about the bargaining solutions is proposed. A sufficient condition and a necessary condition concerning the existence of incentive equilibria are proposed. As an illustrative example,the incentive equilibria for linear-quadratic games are discussed.

本文研究了动态对策协商解的问题,提出了动态对策问题在协商解处的诱导平衡的概念,研究了诱导平衡存在的必要条件和充分条件,并分析了线性二次型动态对策问题的诱导平衡.

>=Aiming at the supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer in a determinative market, this paper studies the conditions of cooperation between firms with symmetrical cost information. We show that in the process of bargaining game on the joint profit, no matter which firm acts firstly, if its pricing power locates within the scope determined by their bargaining cost coefficients, the rational manufacturer and the retailer will choose to cooperate fully and share the joint profits...

>=Aiming at the supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer in a determinative market, this paper studies the conditions of cooperation between firms with symmetrical cost information. We show that in the process of bargaining game on the joint profit, no matter which firm acts firstly, if its pricing power locates within the scope determined by their bargaining cost coefficients, the rational manufacturer and the retailer will choose to cooperate fully and share the joint profits according to the bargaining outcome, realizing two-winning, and furthermore, we check the alteration of this scope with the change of bargaining cost coefficients; Otherwise, if its pricing power locates beyond this scope, either one firm will choose to cooperate fully and the other will choose to cooperate partly or both of them will choose to cooperate partly.

针对一个制造商和一个销售商组成的二级供应链,在确定型市场、制造商与销售商成本信息对称的情况下,研究成员企业合作的条件.证明了在对联合收益分配的讨价还价博弈过程中不管哪一方先行动,只要先行动一方的定价决策权威处于由双方讨价还价成本系数决定的某一范围内,理性的制造商和销售商将选择相互充分合作并按照讨价还价的结果分配联合收益,实现“双赢”.并考察了该范围随双方讨价还价成本系数变化的变动情况.相反,当先行动一方的定价决策权威处于该范围外,制造商和销售商或者其中一方选择充分合作另一方选择部分合作或者同时选择部分合作.

 
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