Game theory and bargaining ability factors are employed to set up a bargaining model for alternate bid for the order transfer under capital-control mode. Order transfer prices are obtained with the model.
In the second part, we establish a long-run cooperative model of duopolistic markets which is based on the traditional Nash bargaining model. We define the long-run equilibrium of bargaining with threats, and prove that the bargaining value of long-run equilibrium pairs is unique.
A rational conjecture is proposed. Under the assumption of the rational conjecture, a class of sequential equilibria of the bargaining model is characterized. At last, outcome of sequential equilibria of the model is compared with the outcome of sequential equilibria of other models.
Finally,using Game theory and Nash Bargaining Model,we probes into the problem of income distribution of virtual enterprise under II-kind asymmetrical information,and brings forward a tactic of repetitious distribution by stage in virtual enterprise,and discusses how can confirm the parameter in the model.
With the axiomatized bargaining modd and reference point bargaining modd developedfor the cooperative game,the consistency of the a value and τ value of the cooperative gameand the Raiffa bargaining solution of the bargaining model developed and the reference pointRaiffa bargaining solution of the reference point bargaining model developed is proved. Thetheory of the cooperative game and the axiomatized method of bargaining is united to a cer-tain extent.
In this paper, some suggestions, which is corresponded to the process of domestic power market reform, to the establishment of operation rule. Subsequently, a new bargaining model of the power bargaining plan and the solution algorithms to several problems of the new model are put forward.
Based on in-depth analyses on the option-forward bargaining theories we draw an operable bargaining model, which considers the stability of the electric power system, Participants under this model are inspirited to adjust the quantity of power consumption as well as a ‘settlement price’, and this trading strategy is helpful to the stability of the system.
The basic conclusion is that a bargaining model approach performs well for interpreting work stoppages associated with contract negotiations, but provides a less than satisfactory explanation of mid-term and unorganized strikes.
A bargaining model and empirical analysis of strike activity across industries
In addition, the paper incorporates arbitration costs into the bargaining model, and the effects of costs on arbitration usage and on the outcomes of negotiated settlements are examined.
We analyze the impact of public commitment strategies as bargaining tools in the negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty using a sequential-bargaining model with incomplete information.
Bargaining postulates are developed and a simple bargaining model is evolved which show conditions under which bargaining will succeed.