By the behavior analysis between buyers and sellers with the Register Deposit and Trade Security Deposit Mechanism,we proved that the strategy of honest trade is not only the Nash Equilibrium in single-stage game,but also the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium in repeated game.
By constructing a dynamic game model of enterprise entry and a complete information dynamic game model of tax rate and enterprise's output,this paper deduces the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium among government and enterprise after collecting the environmental pollution tax,and analyzes the feasibility and results of the tax,thus offer the theoretical foundation for collecting environmental pollution tax.
While there are a large number of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria through a purely non-cooperative game,both the pairwise stable and the most efficient network resource difference,the regulatory department only need to regulate the collusion to avoid anti-competitive behaviours and need not regulate private peering.
This paper gets the solution to sub game perfect nash equilibrium by complete information dynamic game analysis in customer knowledge sharing process, in order to find the condition of realizing customer knowledge sharing.
Directed against the characteristic of oligopsony of market of VTCHP solar water heater market, the thesis researches the equilibrium condition of this market with the game theory, sets up a dynatic game model under the imperfect information condition, concludes that holding and cooperation are the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to promote the development of VTCHP solar water heater market.
Second use the game the paper discusses researches the long-term characteristic theory which the superannuation fund and the fund company cooperates, then obtains between them the cooperation strategy is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
The analysis will show that when the upstream and downstream enterprises countermeasure with the horizontal merger as unique game variables,the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the upstream and downstream enterprises merger respectively.
Under the condition of nonlinear demand function with the cost function defined by learning curve, the repeated game as a multistage dynamic programming problem is formulated, and solve the global monopoly optimal solution, local (stage) optimal solution, and finally the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
We conside a farmer insurance model with n farmers and one insurance company. Gold is needed to purchase the commodities and insurance policy. The sufficient conditions for the existence of perfect Nash equilibriums of the model are given.
The horizontal merger in the upstream and downstream firms in an industry is discussed in this paper. The analysis will show that when the upstream and downstream enterprises countermeasure with the horizontal merger as unique game variables,the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the upstream and downstream enterprises merger respectively. Furthermore,the paper focuses on the conflict of interests among the enterprises,the government and the consumers in the merger.
In the oligopoly market two models of competition with environmental tax are built on the basis of the Cournot static game and the Stackelberg Dynamic game with complete information. The two models show the government′s participation in and out of the game. The Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are analyzed respectively. Relations between the government′s optimal tax ratio and the firms′ optimal production are discussed. The conclusion is applicable for other kinds of taxes.