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payment contract
相关语句
  报酬合约
     Informational Cascade,Herd Behavior of Manager and Payment Contract
     信息追随、管理者从众行为与报酬合约
短句来源
     A Payment Contract Research on Herd Behavior of Manager
     基于报酬合约的经理人羊群行为研究
短句来源
     This paper extends the object of study to general managers. The mechanism of managerial herd behavior is analyzed and the payment contract to avoid this behavior is designed and discussed.
     本文将研究对象拓展至一般企业经理人,分析经理人羊群行为的发生机制,并讨论规避此行为的报酬合约设计。
短句来源
     To avoid the herd behavior of the manager, a payment contract should consist of three parts, namely a sum of fixed payment, a larger proportion of the residual earnings according to performance of the firm and a high penalty according to the decision quality (innovative decision or informational cascade).
     避免管理者从众行为的报酬合约 ,应采取由一笔固定报酬、根据企业绩效分享较多的剩余收益和根据决策质量 (创新决策还是信息追随 )确定较高的惩罚金三种支付组成的报酬形式。
短句来源
  报酬契约
     The anylysis of the choice of performance evaluation standard in managers' payment contract
     浅析经营者报酬契约中业绩评价标准的选择
短句来源
     Analyses on Design of Payment Contract and Encouraging Intension of Managers
     企业经营者报酬契约设计与激励强度分析
短句来源
     The agreement of payment contract between proprietors and operators is a kind of agency problem. There are many defects in traditional payment contract evaluation on the basis of financial indexes,so non-financial indexes are introduced into the overall performance evaluation system.
     所有者与经营者之间报酬契约的签订是一种代理问题,但是传统的以财务指标为基础的报酬契约评价存在种种缺陷,非财务指标被引进企业全面业绩评价体系中。
短句来源
     This article starts with the analysis of the influence of payment contract on the conduct of managing accounting, and mainly deals with the supervision of surplus management through the improvement of stimulating mechanism.
     本文从报酬契约对经理会计行为的影响分析入手,从激励的角度提出通过完善激励机制来进行盈余管理的治理。
短句来源
  “payment contract”译为未确定词的双语例句
     There are some internal relations between financial indexes and non-financial indexes,the uniting of them can better reflect the increase of shareholders' value and increase the validity of payment contract.
     财务指标和非财务指标之间存在内在的关联,二者的结合使用能更好地反映股东价值的增长情况,增加报酬契约的有效性。
短句来源
     It demonstrates that supply chain inventory optimization can be realized through effective transfer payment contract by the manufacturer.
     分析表明,制造商通过设计有效的转移支付合约,可以实现供应链库存的最优化。
短句来源
     The condition and measures of risk co-sharing in cooperation are analyzed, and the corresponding optimized payment contract is designed.
     分析了合作中双方风险分担的条件及措施,同时讨论了与之对应的最优报酬合同和剩余索取权问题,并给出了具有现实指导意义的几个新的观点。
短句来源
     It is critical choice for enterprises' reformation to build manager-encouraging system which market play a fundamental role and implement marketable manager payment contract.
     构建市场起基础作用的企业经营者激励机制,实行企业经营者报酬契约的市场化是深化企业改革的必然选择。
短句来源
     The design of payment contract is not only based on the aim of stimulating management, but also has a deep connection with the accounting conduct of managing.
     报酬契约的设计不仅基于管理激励的目的,还与经理会计行为密切相关。
短句来源
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  payment contract
With an uncertain payment contract, the seller produces a quantity that maximizes the same function.
      
The quantity exchanged with an advance payment contract equals the quantity exchanged with an uncertain payment contract.
      
The service cost to the clients are nil or low with the municipal payment contract, as for other secondary care.
      
Therefore, a buyer who declines an advance payment contract is not as trustworthy as he claims to be.
      
This date appears beside the signature line of the AIAS Official of the payment contract below.
      
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The analysis of the manager's agent behavior in the principal-agent framework neglects the fact that under the given incentive arrangement, the manager will still have some opportunist motives which do not offend the interests of the shareholders, such as the motive of "pursuing not excellency but no faults". This thesis puts a particular emphasis on one of these activities, namely the herd behavior of the manager. The main conclusion is that the herd behavior of the manager is essentially informational cascade,...

The analysis of the manager's agent behavior in the principal-agent framework neglects the fact that under the given incentive arrangement, the manager will still have some opportunist motives which do not offend the interests of the shareholders, such as the motive of "pursuing not excellency but no faults". This thesis puts a particular emphasis on one of these activities, namely the herd behavior of the manager. The main conclusion is that the herd behavior of the manager is essentially informational cascade, the aim of which is to build up his reputation. The change of manager's payoff structure is an important factor that changes his herd behavior. To avoid the herd behavior of the manager, a payment contract should consist of three parts, namely a sum of fixed payment, a larger proportion of the residual earnings according to performance of the firm and a high penalty according to the decision quality (innovative decision or informational cascade).

在委托代理框架下分析管理者代理行为 ,忽视了管理者在既定的激励安排下还会表现出一些不以侵害股东利益为代价的消极的机会主义动机 ,如“不求有功 ,但求无过”的动机。本文侧重于其中一种行为 ,即管理者从众行为的分析。主要结论是 ,管理者从众行为实际上是信息追随 ,目的是建立自身的信誉。管理者支付结构变化是改变管理者从众行为的重要因素。避免管理者从众行为的报酬合约 ,应采取由一笔固定报酬、根据企业绩效分享较多的剩余收益和根据决策质量 (创新决策还是信息追随 )确定较高的惩罚金三种支付组成的报酬形式。

The enterprise annuity is an endowment assurance system instituted, under the guidance of the relevant government policy, by enterprises and their staff who acted on their own and in accordance with their economic conditions——an important part of multiple-level endowment assurance system, which we were calling “enterprises' complementary endowment assurance(ECEA)". In the year 2000, the State Council promulgated,“The Experimental Program to Perfect the Social Security System in Cities and Towns", in which it...

The enterprise annuity is an endowment assurance system instituted, under the guidance of the relevant government policy, by enterprises and their staff who acted on their own and in accordance with their economic conditions——an important part of multiple-level endowment assurance system, which we were calling “enterprises' complementary endowment assurance(ECEA)". In the year 2000, the State Council promulgated,“The Experimental Program to Perfect the Social Security System in Cities and Towns", in which it is decided that ECEA be standardized as “enterprises' annuity(EA)", managed in the form of private account and run according to the law of the market. Viewed from the aspect of legality as well as operating features, EA is a long-term, promised-to-pay deferred-payment contract protected by law; it is also a new form of ECEA that has been comprehensively developed in the sectors of fund management, fund operation and treatment system. The formulation and development of China's EA system has marked both the transition from China's endowment system to internationally established model of “three-pillar system" and a stage in the reform and development of China's endowment assurance system. Mainly analyzed in this paper are the social economic cost of the current non-tax-privilege policy and the low efficiency thereof. Meanwhile, we have elaborated the necessity for China to carry out the tax privilege policy in enterprises, and analyzed, by a case study, the impact of this policy upon the aggregated tax amount.

企业年金是在国家政策指导下 ,由企业及其职工依据经济状况自主建立的一项养老保险制度 ,是多层次养老保险体系的一个重要组成部分 ,我们过去一直称之为“企业补充养老保险” ,2000年 ,国务院颁布《关于完善城镇社会保障体系的试点方案》决定:将企业补充养老保险规范为企业年金 ,采用个人账户式管理 ,实行市场化管理运营。从企业年金的法律关系和运营特征来看 ,它是一个长期承诺的、受法律保护的延期支付合同 ,也是一个基金管理、资金运用和待遇制度不同环节综合发展的补充养老制度。中国企业年金体系的建立和发展 ,标志着中国养老体系正在朝着国际通行的“三支柱”养老模式 (three - pillarsystem)转变 ,同时也标志着中国养老保险体系的改革和发展进入一个新的阶段。本文主要分析了现行非税惠政策的社会经济成本以及现行政策的低效率 ,同时阐述了中国对企业年金实行税收优惠政策的必要性 ,并实证分析了税惠政策对税收总量的影响。

In general principalagent model, the principal usually use the linearpayment contract to incentive the agent for the moralhazard of the agent. We discuss the linearpayment contract under the frame of principalagent model and find that the main function of it is transfer parts of the risk to the agent so as to achieve the Pareto optimality rather than incentive the agent. Under a certain assumptions, we work out the closedform solution of this model and test the explanation of this model.

在通常的委托 代理问题中,由于代理人存在道德风险,委托人通常采用线性支付合同来激励代理人的行动。本文在委托 代理框架下,讨论了委托投资的最优线性分担合同。我们发现,线性合同主要并不是用作激励,而是把一部分风险转移给代理人,以达到风险的帕雷托最优配置。在一定假设条件下,我们求出了问题的显式解,并对模型的解释能力进行了考查。

 
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