Based on the analysis above, the game model of signaling for firms is built in duopoly. The research studies the impacts of signaling cost and the proportion of different consumer on signal selection of the firm through the existence conditions of separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium,combining with the properties of the firm, consumers and rivals in electronic markets, and presents the strategies of signaling product quality in different statuses finally.
After the game model of signaling for firm is built in duopoly,the paper studies the impacts of signaling cost and the proportion of different consumer on signal selection of the firm through the existence conditions of separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium.
Based on the literature review,this paper explains why sequential-financing hypothesis should be explored further,and makes theoretical analysis to conclude that there is separating equilibrium by the means of Game Theory.
Based on the definition of reputation,this essay analyzes the ways that banks employ to construct their reputation. It is shown that essentially to construct reputation is a signaling strategic investment, which has a separating equilibrium enabling banks of different types to distinguish with each other.
The maturity of the debt can be viewed as a signal about the firm's quality sent to the financial sector. It is demonstrated that there exists a separating equilibrium in which higher - quality firms select the higher proportion of short - term debt.
The result is consistent with the signaling of the insider trader reputation, the lock-up argument, and the only least-cost separating equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion.
In contrast to the single separating equilibrium in the classic Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance market, multiple separating equilibria are identified in this article: three in the discrete case and four in the continuous case.
We show that in such a market a separating equilibrium where trade size is informative does not exist and hence there is no price effect for large trades.
We then show that there exist conditions under which a universal enforcement of equitable redemption results in a higher total surplus than this separating equilibrium.
We show that there exists a separating equilibrium where high-risk borrowers choose to include equitable redemption (and pay a higher interest rate) while low-risk borrowers choose not to (and pay a lower interest rate).
In the paper, it is tried to explain some credit behaviors of Chinese commercial bank in the period of economic transition. The micro-mechanism for forming large amount of bad credit assets in commercial banks is analyzed. Collateral and co-signer's collateral could hardly provide informational signals due to some special factors in the period. The banking administr-ation system also makes credit interest rate lose its signal function. Enterprise's individual participation constraint condition can be ver...
Very high initial returns can be found in China's A share stock market. In this paper, we empirically identify some of the causes of such high initial returns, using data compiled for 472 A share Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) listed between January 1, 1995 and May 30, 1998. We attribute the high initial returns to the disconnection of the pricing mechanisms between A share stock's primary market and its secondary market. We also find some of the factors that have significant influence on the initial re...
In the light of the tech-gain oriented merger between bigger firm and small firm in IT industry, this paper, using the game theory, discusses the asymmetric information of this kind of merger, and gives the reason of adverse selection and the pre-research of small firms in this kind of mergers. Furthermore, this paper studies the relation between the existing condition of separating equilibrium and the cost of pre-research.