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residual control
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     WEIGHTED RESIDUAL METHODS
     加权残数法
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     In DDTs the residual level of p,p?
     DDTs中p,p?
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     :and intensity of residual stresses(?)
     和残余应力强度(?)
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     RESIDUAL STRESS OF COMPOSITES AND ITS CONTROL
     复合材料残余应力及其控制
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     (3) Residual tensile strength.
     (3)剩余压缩强度;
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  residual control
It is distinguished between residual control schemes and modified control schemes.
      
Time series residual control charts were also developed for the data sets.
      
The residual control charts of ARFIMA models are proposed in this study.
      
The residual control of a foliar spray is typically between 2 to 4 weeks.
      
The notion of ownership as residual control is relatively clear for a simple asset like a car.
      
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By the Penrose's Effect is the managerial constraint of the growth of firms a function of the adaptation and integration of new managerial service. But in the entrepreneur-controlled-firms (ECFs) the growth process is more affected by the managerial capabilities and the span of the control of the entrepreneur himself as owner. And the related key problem is, how the allocation of the residual control rights of the firm affects the growth of the firm.For ECFs we analyze specially the relationship between...

By the Penrose's Effect is the managerial constraint of the growth of firms a function of the adaptation and integration of new managerial service. But in the entrepreneur-controlled-firms (ECFs) the growth process is more affected by the managerial capabilities and the span of the control of the entrepreneur himself as owner. And the related key problem is, how the allocation of the residual control rights of the firm affects the growth of the firm.For ECFs we analyze specially the relationship between the "return of control right"and the growth of the firm. In this paper we give also a further study on the constraint effects by the transfer of control rights and in the changing process from EFC to modern hierarchical governancein China

企业成长的管理约束反应为彭罗斯效应中吸纳与集成新管理能力的问题,而在企业家控制的企业,则更多的表现为受到企业家个人经营能力和控制幅度的制约。与此密切相关的问题是,企业剩余控制权的分配如可影响企业的成长?对这一问题的分析有必要区分分散化的(公众公司)和集中化的(所有者控制的企业)所有权结构。本文在此基础上分析了所谓企业家“控制权回报”与企业成长的关系,并进而研究企业在走向制度化和控制权转移(接班人)问题对企业长期稳定发展的影响。

This paper is concerned with the characteristics,economic implications and causes of incomplete contracts and the flowing of the property rights as well as the effects and the optimal allocations of property rights.It also argues that the cause of production of residual rights is due to the incomplete contract.If the residual control is combined with residual claim,and they are allocated symmetrically to all factors,thus producing more effective incentive function to all participants.

论述了不完全合约的性质、经济含义和产生原因 ,并分析了产权交易与流动以及产权效率的最优配置问题。说明了正是由于产权的不完全性 ,才产生了剩余权利问题 ,把剩余控制权和剩余索取结合在一起 ,分散对称地分配给生产要素所有者 ,最能产生有效的激励作用。

Enterprise is a kind of incomplete contract and ownership of enterprise comes from it. The contract of allocation ownership of enterprise is based on the merits of property rights of human capital and non-human capital. And the Pareto-efficient contract is a equilibrium result through dynamic games of all-parts. We point out that the effective allocation ownership of state-owned enterprise is correlative stakeholders all-parts corporate contract and the residual control and residual claim is allocated...

Enterprise is a kind of incomplete contract and ownership of enterprise comes from it. The contract of allocation ownership of enterprise is based on the merits of property rights of human capital and non-human capital. And the Pareto-efficient contract is a equilibrium result through dynamic games of all-parts. We point out that the effective allocation ownership of state-owned enterprise is correlative stakeholders all-parts corporate contract and the residual control and residual claim is allocated from concentration to collaboration distribution step by step.

]企业是一种不完备合约的内在特征是企业所有权的存在,而人力资本和非人力资本的产权特征决定了企业所有权安排的合约形式,最优的合约安排是参与者之间不断博弈的均衡解。有效率的国有企业所有权安排是利益相关者共享式多边合约安排,剩余索取和剩余控制权会由集中对称安排不断趋向分散对称安排。

 
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