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non-cooperative bargaining model
相关语句
  非合作议价模型
     A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model of Urban Unemployment in Transitional China
     转型期中国城市职工下岗的非合作议价模型分析
短句来源
     With a non-cooperative bargaining model, this paper researches the forming mechanism of urban unemployment when state-owned enterprise (SOE) is prohibited from hiring rural labor and when it is not.
     本文通过一个非合作议价模型,研究了禁止城市国有企业雇用农民工和允许其雇用农民工两种条件下城市职工下岗形成的机制。
短句来源
  相似匹配句对
     ON NON-OBJECTIFICATION
     论非对象化
短句来源
     and "non-linearity".
     既要注重"线性",又要注重"非线性"。
短句来源
     Application of Non Prosecution
     存疑不起诉的适用
短句来源
     second, Non Rival;
     二是非竞争性;
短句来源
     Cooperative Naturalism
     协作的自然主义
短句来源
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With a non-cooperative bargaining model, this paper researches the forming mechanism of urban unemployment when state-owned enterprise (SOE) is prohibited from hiring rural labor and when it is not. Comparison between this two circumstances shows that once the artificial limits on rural labor's employment in city are loosened, wage will get down to the level as a competitive labor market, and the number of urban unemployment tend to decrease in a long term. Therefore, some cities' usual policies for urban...

With a non-cooperative bargaining model, this paper researches the forming mechanism of urban unemployment when state-owned enterprise (SOE) is prohibited from hiring rural labor and when it is not. Comparison between this two circumstances shows that once the artificial limits on rural labor's employment in city are loosened, wage will get down to the level as a competitive labor market, and the number of urban unemployment tend to decrease in a long term. Therefore, some cities' usual policies for urban labor market against rural labor lead to more urban unemployment rather than less. This paper also proves the unemployment characteristics of classical model in transitional China.

本文通过一个非合作议价模型,研究了禁止城市国有企业雇用农民工和允许其雇用农民工两种条件下城市职工下岗形成的机制。通过对比证明,一旦放开对于农民工就业的人为限制,工资将降到竞争性劳动市场的水平,在长期趋势下,会减少国企下岗的人数。通常一些城市采取的旨在保护城市劳动力免受外来农民工就业竞争的政策,反而导致了更多的城市下岗职工的存在。本文也证明了中国经济转型期失业的古典模型的性质。

 
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