there are contradiction between capacity of search and converge in genetic algorithm. To make goal of two-aspect profit,we introduce game theory in genetic algorithm for coordinate with this contradictio,which to take capacity of search and converge as two partners in Nash game.
The service price is used for decision variable, A logit-type choice model is used to predict the client choices on logistics corporation, the most income whose income and payout is synthetically considered is used for use function, based on all above said, a generalized Nash game is achieved, which can be formulated as a quasi-variational inequality problem.
In the maximally entangle state, Results show that a special Nash equilibria exist in the range of 0 < p ≤ 0.622 (p is the quantum noise parameter), then disappear in the range of 0.622 < p ≤ 1. Increasing the amount of quantum noise leads the reduction of the quantum player's payoff.
Study shows that under the specific operation environment the core decision makers of supply chain can apply the integrated decision model dynamically, so as to maximize the whole efficiency and effectiveness of the alliance and maintain its stability.
By extending the concept of asymptotic weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium point to vector-valued case, Tikhonov well-posedness and Hadamard well-posedness results of the multiobjective generalized games are established in this paper.
Questions for the existence of the Nash equilibrium of the game of centers in pure strategies are studied.
It is shown that at any distribution of the incomes from the work of an active system among a few centers and the existence of at least one Pareto-ineffective Nash equilibrium, any Pareto-effective outcome can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium.
It is proved that in the system consisting of two centers there always exists a Pareto-effective Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium: Infinite-Depth Point Information Structures
Analytical solution for a class of linear quadratic open-loop Nash game with multiple players
We consider activators and inhibitors of angiogenesis as players of a Nash game.
We model a Bayesian-Nash game where the monopolist has private knowledge of the cost-reducing effects of R>amp;amp;D investment to generate process innovations.
Two major deficiencies exist with such a formulation: One is that the resulting Nash equilibrium may not exist, due to the nonconvexity in each player's problem; the other is that such a nonconvex Nash game is computationally intractable.
A dynamic Cournot-Nash game: a representation of a finitely repeated feedback game
The application of the mixed Nash-equilibrium concept yields a rather counter-intuitive prediction which apparently contradicts the empirical data.
We show that in quasisupermodular games that satisfy strict single crossing property the least and greatest undominated Nash-equilibrium can be reached by iteratively eliminating dominated strategies.
I characterize the Nash-equilibrium-set of such a game as the union of the Nash-equilibrium-sets of certain derived games with complete preferences.
In analogy to the notion of an "equilibrium of actions and beliefs" we define and characterize a generalized Nash-equilibrium and show its existence under general conditions.
It is shown that the Nash-equilibrium solution of this class of nonzero-sum games can be characterized by an equivalent nonlinear program which leads in some cases to a pair of complementary eigenvalue problems.
A sealed bid auction model for an indivisible object with two bidders and incomplete information on both sides is studied.It is shown that for all auction mechanism,except the second highest bid price rule,all equilibrium strategies are continuously differential and strict monotonically increasing,and morever the set of Nash equilibria is completely described by a boundary value problem for a system of singular differential equations.An example is given.Finally,a particular kind of the optimal auction problem...
A sealed bid auction model for an indivisible object with two bidders and incomplete information on both sides is studied.It is shown that for all auction mechanism,except the second highest bid price rule,all equilibrium strategies are continuously differential and strict monotonically increasing,and morever the set of Nash equilibria is completely described by a boundary value problem for a system of singular differential equations.An example is given.Finally,a particular kind of the optimal auction problem is discussed.
A model of leader-follower multistage game is established. An effective Stackel-berg stragtegy whic attains Nash equilibrium solution is presented. The optimum strategy and the payoff value in linear constraint are discussed.
On the base of evolution theory,this paper presents a simulation model for obtaining Nash equilibrium and also identify the suitability of this model under the condition of different strategy space adopted by players.